The Pacheco Pass alignment, rather than one through the Altamont Pass further to the north, was the fastest and “most environmentally responsible option” for the high-speed train system, minimizing impacts on wetlands as well as the San Francisco Bay and eliminating the need for another San Francisco Bay crossing, bridge or tunnel,” the authority says.

Other arguments included Pacheco being more direct and allowing for faster service, as well as enabling more service to San José, the state’s third-largest city and one of its most important economic hubs, and more and faster service on the popular San Francisco – San José corridor.

The debate over Altamont and Pacheco went on for a LONG time but it was ended in July 2008. I remained neutral – each option had its pros and cons which evened out in the end. Once the choice was made, however, it seemed sensible to accept it and move on for the sake of the project. Voters approved the choice in November, and for nearly two years the entire project has been built on the assumption that Pacheco would be the route.

However, certain groups never accepted this. One of them is David Schonbrunn’s TRANSDEF, who claimed to support HSR but opposed Prop 1A, partly because of the choice of Pacheco over Altamont. Another is Richard Tolmach, who has also become a critic of HSR and has long been pushing for a revival of Altamont. And Gary Patton’s Planning and Conservation League have similarly been fighting high speed rail, apparently in pursuit of Gary Patton’s agenda of opposition to passenger rail that has led to environmental damage and lost money across Northern California.

At the same time, Peninsula HSR critics and opponents, primarily motivated by NIMBYism, began to call for a revival of the Altamont alignment. Their logic was that it would enable a bypass of Palo Alto and part of Menlo Park (though not the neighborhood along the Dumbarton rail route). That would leave much of the Caltrain corridor unimproved, and San José in limbo, but those were acceptable outcomes for these opponents.

Unsurprisingly, the Peninsula HSR critics and Schonbrunn/Tolmach have now realized they have common interests. Tomorrow morning at Burlingame High School, Schonbrunn, Tolmach and PCL will be joined by Palo Alto Mayor Pat Burt and Burlingame Mayor Cathy Baylock (and potentially others) to announce they have partnered with a French design team to propose a new Altamont alignment. Their press release is below:

Altamont Revival Press Release

Detail can be found on the TRANSDEF site. A look at Exhibit C shows the route they plan to use from SFO to Tracy.

The route is notable for several reasons:

1. Proposes routing the trains onto Highway 101, despite the fact that this would likely significantly depress ridership by bypassing the dense urban centers of the Peninsula (and yes, the Peninsula rail corridor is dense), could drive up costs significantly by requiring reconfiguration of interchanges or very tall HSR viaduct structures

2. Proposes then routing the trains over the Dumbarton rail corridor, despite known concerns about environmental impact

3. Proposes then routing the trains through Fremont, perhaps through a costly cut-and-cover tunnel under the power lines, or perhaps with aerial structures in Fremont neighborhoods (which apparently is OK to Peninsula proponents of this plan, since it seems Fremont doesn’t count as much as Palo Alto)

4. Proposes then routing the trains through open land southeast of Pleasanton and Livermore without a station there, despite claims going back years by TRANSDEF and others about the Altamont corridor supposedly having so many more riders

5. Is vague about how to connect the route to San José, despite the city being the third-largest city in the state and one of North America’s most important hubs of economic activity, as if San José was just an afterthought.

Their proposed Altamont route appears to be a recipe for sprawl at the expense of ridership. This is very ironic, given the fact that one of TRANSDEF’s chief criticisms of Pacheco is that it fuels sprawl. The route would run to the south of Pleasanton and Livermore through what are currently vineyards and open land, instead of following the existing Altamont rail corridor. That would avoid running it through those two cities, but it means any possible Pleasanton/Livermore station would be a “greenfield” station – which is much more likely to fuel sprawl. That’s significant in the Tri-Valley area, especially Livermore, which has been battling for years to limit sprawl and preserve open space.

The plan relies heavily on the French model of HSR, which sometimes bypasses city centers (though not Paris) in favor of greenfield stations, although that model has produced questionable results. They seem to ignore the Spanish and Japanese model of running through city centers, choosing to cherry-pick for unclear reasons.

When the proposal is unveiled tomorrow, it’s going to be cast as an answer to all the project’s problems. But it comes with many unknowns and huge downsides. Depressed ridership, potentially higher cost, inefficient service to San José, inability to help upgrade the Peninsula rail corridor, and unknown but likely significant environmental and community impacts – it all seems like quite a lot just to appease a few Altamont diehards and a few Peninsula NIMBYs.

Which is all this really is. Instead of sitting down and figuring out a sensible solution to implement the plan voters approved, including a San Francisco to San José segment eligible for $2 billion in federal funding over the next two years, these critics and city leaders want to waste more time and toss away that money in favor of a study that is inherently designed to suit their own desires. Rather than working with us to ensure we have the federal funding to get the system built properly, or to help advocate for the best design on the Caltrain corridor, this group still thinks they can make one last go of it, massively changing the project at the last minute for their own reasons.

Ironically enough, late design changes are usually the number one of cause of cost-overruns on megaprojects.

Yet another risk to the project the State Auditor strangely left unmentioned.

The plaintiffs hope their motion, to be filed in Sacramento Superior Court within the next two weeks, will lead to a full trial that would include evidence discovery and witness testimony. Ultimately, they hope the suit will reverse the rail authority’s December 2007 decision to run its bullet train through the Peninsula instead of the East Bay….

The plaintiffs’ attorney, Oakland-based Stuart Flashman, said a “writ of error coram nobis,” while uncommon, can be used to reopen a case even after a judgment has been made, as long as previously unknown evidence comes to light after the case closes.

The plaintiffs claim a group of concerned Peninsula residents last week obtained documents from 2007 that show the Bay Area Metropolitan Transportation Commission may have hid parts of an independent study that showed less favorable ridership models. The residents, called Californians Advocating Responsible Rail Design, circulated the data to city officials, who Flashman said were “furious” at the discovery.

That’s CARRD’s spin, though Rosenberg takes pains to try and present it neutrally – and correctly notes it is MTC and not the California High Speed Rail Authority that is at issue here. However, it’s unclear that anything was “hidden” – MTC and CHSRA divulged the data upon request, and these coefficients aren’t always included in the published reports. Further, the ridership models weren’t “less favorable” overall – the numbers merely flipped between the Altamont and Pacheco alignments. There is as of yet no evidence to suggest this was inaccurate or illegitimate, although HSR critics have been busy claiming that it was.

Rosenberg’s article continues:

Flashman, who has already begun drafting the motion, said the new data makes the ridership study the authority used to justify its route “fatally flawed, but none of us knew it.”

Flashman is just plain wrong here and is using the “magic bullet” to concoct a theory that the entire study is “fatally flawed.” Again, there is no such evidence this is the case. If the coefficient change was in error, then you simply recalculate the ridership and the fares accordingly. One error, whether deliberate or not, does not at all indicate that any of the rest of the study is flawed. It certainly creates a PR and political problem, but that’s not the same as an evidentiary problem.

Even if the specific element of the ridership numbers in question was flawed, it might not really matter for the EIR and therefore render the effort to reopen the lawsuit invalid:

But the claim, even if true, may not be enough. The ridership numbers may not have any impact on the rail line’s environmental impact, which is the only basis on which the judge could reopen the case.

In addition, this legal maneuver may not be something that the cities and TRANSDEF can actually pull off, as Rosenberg quoted Kopp, himself a retired Superior Court judge, saying the “writ of error coram nobis” was something he’d only seen used in criminal cases.

Rosenberg’s article is also noteworthy for his accurate portrayal of the outcome of the Menlo Park/Atherton lawsuit:

The plaintiffs last summer lost the majority of their suit, which they filed in Sacramento Superior Court in August 2008. They cited environmental laws in challenging the authority board’s certification of an early planning document that picked the Pacheco Pass as the Bay Area route instead of the Altamont Pass.

But Judge Michael Kenny did rule that two areas of the authority’s report needed more study: Vibration and track use from San Jose to Gilroy. The authority is redoing that work while it chugs along with more advanced planning.

Flashman went as far as to suggest a possible criminal fraud investigation against those at the MTC responsible for concealing ridership data, if in fact they did. But such an investigation would come from the attorney general’s office, which is also representing the rail authority in the lawsuit.

It’s not inconceivable that the Attorney General’s office would launch such an investigation, but it is also unlikely, since there is nothing to yet indicate any wrongdoing was done. Indeed, while the coefficient change does indeed “raise eyebrows,” as Brian Stanke put it, the change itself hasn’t been shown to have been an errant calculation.

Still, it’s clear that the cities of Menlo Park and Atherton aren’t done fighting the HSR project as it currently exists. Ironically enough, even if Altamont somehow rises from the dead and is again chosen as the primary HSR route, it will still cut through parts of Menlo Park. As it turns out, it’s the poorer neighborhoods that would have the trains in their backyards. Which raises questions of environmental justice, as wealthier residents seem happy to dump the problem in someone else’s lap. While I don’t think the trains would cause environmental harm to those neighborhoods, it would be a pretty obvious example of class-based NIMBYism.

Further, the Altamont alignment raises many of the same questions and controversies as the Pacheco alignment. Palo Alto might be relieved to not have the project in their community, but Fremont, Pleasanton and Livermore might not be so pleased to themselves become a dumping ground. There will be NIMBYs there who fight aspects of the project as well. And of course, without HSR funds, Caltrain’s electrification project will face a significant setback.

The Altamont alignment also creates environmental permitting issues through the Don Edwards wildlife refuge in and near the San Francisco Bay. It also potentially complicates the operations of the HSR system, with San Jose being served by a spur instead of being a prominent station on the mainline.

In any case, I am sure these questions will continue to be debated in the comments, and it’s a worthy discussion to have, even if there aren’t yet any conclusions that can be reached, especially since there’s a lot we still don’t know about the ridership questions CARRD has raised. Menlo Park and Atherton are awfully quick to use those questions as a basis for trying to reopen a lawsuit they already mostly lost. It’s a shame that instead of working to improve the project, they continue to prefer to try and undermine it with lawsuits that cost their governments and the state government more money at a time when neither can really afford it.

Note to readers: Apologies for the delayed approval of pending comments the last few days. Been in all-day meetings here in LA. Things will be back to normal starting tomorrow.

In 2009 the opposition shifted. Recognizing that trying to argue against the concept of HSR in California was a non-starter, opponents instead tried to undermine the project by arguing that the route choices were flawed, or that communities would be destroyed by the project. After a burst of NIMBY energy in early 2009, this began to fade as it became clear that state and federal lawmakers were not going to let a group of prosperous Peninsula residents block a project that had widespread public support and was a necessary part of the state’s economic recovery. Indeed, by early 2010 NIMBYism had faded significantly as a threat to the overall project, though it continued to play a big role in debates over routing and implementation.

By 2010 the folks who didn’t want HSR to happen had focused on trying to destroy the project and the CHSRA’s credibility by combing through every document available to find ANY flaw they could – a search for a magic bullet, like decades of JFK assassination conspiracy theorists. It didn’t matter whether the flaw actually meant the whole HSR project was fatally flawed. All that mattered was that some discrepancy be found. Because if that were possible, then they could use that discrepancy to argue that the project is flawed without ever having to show precisely how the flaw means the project isn’t viable.

Let’s be very clear about that. The goal wasn’t to explain why HSR won’t generate operating surpluses, or suggest that California doesn’t need the trains. The goal of HSR critics was to instead find a flaw and assume that finding a flaw automatically meant HSR has to stop, that everything the Authority says is false, that all numbers don’t pan out, etc, etc.

It is a fundamentally dishonest approach to public oversight of a project. But that is precisely what has happened here.

First it was the business plan. We were told that the plan was “illegal” because it suggested a public guarantee for investors. It wasn’t clear whether that actually was illegal, and in any case it didn’t get much media traction. We were then told that the fact that the overall cost estimate changed was proof that it was a boondoggle and CHSRA can’t be trusted. Of course, the shift was due to federal rules regarding year-of-expenditure costing. We were then told that a model that proposed setting fares at 83% of airfare instead of 50% was somehow a sellout and a bait-and-switch and meant the project was dishonest and we should revote.

But none of those criticisms stuck. Sure, some parts of the business plan still need work, but that’s natural in an evolving project like this. And the HSR critics seem to have instinctively understood this line of attack was going nowhere, because they quickly shifted toward a focus on ridership.

This was partly due to signals sent by HSR opponent Senator Alan Lowenthal, who has repeatedly tried to destroy the project. He even lied to the public when, on KQED a week ago, he claimed that everyone who spoke at the Palo Alto hearing raised “concerns” about the project – Lowenthal did not once mention the outpouring of public support for the project he had heard.

HSR critics picked up on Lowenthal’s extremely dishonest and irresponsible claim that “the ridership numbers don’t pass the smell test” as a green light to zero in on the ridership estimates to try and find their single flaw that would somehow bring down the project they disliked, since every other line of attack over the last two years had failed them. Lowenthal’s original “smell test” claim was totally baseless, since he had NO explanation for why they didn’t seem right. No evidence, no logical argument. All he said was it didn’t feel right to him. That’s not a serious statement, certainly not one that should be made by a state legislator with oversight powers over an important project.

The initial efforts of HSR critics to attack the ridership numbers here in 2010 was the laughable attempt by the PCC to suggest that HSR and Amtrak were legitimate comparisons – that any idea that HSR would draw more riders at its stations than Amtrak at its NEC stations was somehow ridiculous. In fact, that is precisely what will happen and is a totally justifiable claim.

So they quickly abandoned that, but did not abandon the search for their magic bullet. This week, they claimed they found it. Here’s what we know:

1. Cambridge Systematics wrote in a letter dated January 29, 2010 that the MTC chose not to include the final coefficients in the final project report. This was stated neutrally, as the letter clearly indicates. Cambridge Systematics did not claim MTC or CHSRA was being dishonest, fraudulent, or anything else. All they said was, in effect, “we weren’t the ones who chose not to include that information. Go ask MTC.” Yet HSR critics claim this was “deliberately withheld,” for reasons unstated yet apparently sinister. How do we know the reasons were sinister? Well, actually, we don’t. We’re supposed to just believe people who have a vested interest in making HSR look bad.

2. The coefficients in question were modified, as is claimed to be regular and legitimate practice. It is important to keep in mind that it remains unknown why the coefficients were changed. One report indicates it was done to assess the impact of travel time on ridership, but that does not exactly explain why the coefficients changed by the amounts they did. In the absence of that info, it would be wrong to assume that means CHSRA did something bad. Yet that is precisely the assumption being made by HSR critics. We’re supposed to jump to conclusions because critics ask us to do so.

3. Nobody has explained what the impact of the coefficient change actually was. Did it totally change the ridership numbers for Altamont and Pacheco, which were still very close even after the change? Was it alone responsible for the choice of Pacheco? Realize that Peninsula HSR critics have a vested interest in undermining the Pacheco alignment, because it might theoretically revive the Altamont alignment, which would direct the trains away from the communities that have been most vocally opposed to HSR (Menlo Park, Atherton, and Palo Alto). [UPDATE: Brian Stanke shows in the comments the shift took Altamont from 69 million to 65 million riders, and Pacheco from 65 million to 70 million riders.]

4. More importantly, nobody – not one single person – has explained how this invalidates ANYTHING regarding the overall ridership numbers, the revenue estimates, or the fiscal plans. We are supposed to just believe that because one controversial change was discovered, that suddenly the whole HSR project is in dire peril.

Nonsense.

What we have here is a question about how one element of one part of one ridership estimate was made. The question can be answered fairly straightfowardly, without a rush to judgement, and I hope that is precisely what we will get. I have communicated to the Authority my belief that complete openness is in their best interest, and I have every reason to believe they feel exactly the same way. After all, the ridership info in question WAS made public when HSR critics asked for it, wasn’t it?!

So why is this “magic bullet theory” getting so much attention? Let me explain some reasons why.

Americans are trained to think nobody rides trains and they all lose money, so anything that reinforces that frame helps kill HSR projects. As we know, this assumption is complete nonsense. Many passenger rail systems of various kinds in the country have significant ridership and meet their goals. HSR in particular consistently posts high ridership numbers across the globe. Further, all HSR systems, including Amtrak’s Acela, generate profits “above the rail” – meaning operating costs are covered, no ongoing subsidy is required. That is not true of California freeways, for example, which require a costly state subsidy to maintain operations, since gas taxes are insufficient to pay for necessary upkeep, certainly not for adding capacity (eve Orange County has used sales taxes to subsidize capital construction on new freeway lanes). But because HSR is a train, well, it’s easy to assume that it’s going to fail anyway, so anything that reinforces that preexisting assumption of failure is useful.

The media in particular are trained to believe that any discrepancy on the part of government is a sign of scandal. Plenty of reporters and media outlets make a living exposing government problems in breathless tones. Sometimes these are significant. But they usually don’t suggest the public service in question should be abolished or ended. When the University of California has a scandal over executive pay, nobody proposes the solution is to close down UC. When the East Span of the Bay Bridge cost estimates came in way above estimates, we didn’t decide to not replace the span. When hospitals commit billing errors, we don’t shut down the hospital. Instead in those cases we solve the underlying problems, ensure anyone who screwed up or intentionally erred is held accountable, and we move on to ensure we don’t lose sight of the big picture. Yet we’re supposed to now throw out all HSR plans and the project itself because a controversial coefficient change was found? Really?

Stephen Colbert was right – “truthiness” has replaced the truth. This entire controversy over ridership is a classic example of truthiness – “a “truth” that a person claims to know intuitively “from the gut” without regard to evidence, logic, intellectual examination, or facts.” When Alan Lowenthal said the ridership numbers “don’t pass the smell test,” he was engaging in truthiness. When HSR critics say the coefficient change means the entire ridership estimate is flawed and HSR is doomed, they too are engaging in truthiness. They found a magic bullet that they believe validates their preexisting worldview and now we’re all supposed to fall in line behind them and agree HSR sucks and we should just quit. No, I don’t think so.

A severe recession has created a public mood less accepting of any change or new idea at all, mobilizing public fear of spending new money on something that might not work. Across the political world, we see regressive forces beginning to prevail in their quest to stop us from solving deeper problems merely by suggesting the solutions might cost money or that the solutions might be imperfect. In a week where we learn one of California’s largest insurance companies will raise rates by over 30% on individual policy holders this year, we’re supposed to believe that health care reform is a bad idea that should be abandoned. After a decade of accepting that global warming is real and we should do something about it, we’re now supposed to believe that a few stupid emails sent by some British scientists somehow invalidate the entire effort to address the climate crisis, that we should instead do nothing while our planet heats up, our sea levels rise, and our state becomes drier (don’t let recent El Niño rains fool you).

There is a widespread effort in this country to use fear, uncertainty, and doubt – and especially concern about spending money – to keep the 20th century alive at all costs and to destroy any effort to do anything new. What we are seeing with this silly “magic bullet theory” being peddled by HSR critics is not at all different from the people trying to repeal AB 32 or trying to stop federal health care reform from happening. It all involves critics and defenders of the status quo taking false or misleading claims about one piece of the overall reform or need to act and using them to insinuate the whole reform or underlying issue is nonsense and should be ignored – even though their claims have not actually shown what they claim has been shown.

It’s like assuming a kid who flunked a math test is mentally challenged and doesn’t deserve to continue their education. It’s like assuming that because Apollo 1 burned up on the launch pad that we shouldn’t go to the moon.

In short, it’s absurd to use one controversy to attack an entire project. But that is what the HSR critics want to do, because all they feel they have to do is sow doubt, whether or not it’s backed by reasonable analysis, and they’ll win.

I hope for the sake of this state and its future that we will reject that, and demand solid analysis backed by strong evidence from all sides in the HSR discussion. If someone at MTC or the CHSRA did something they shouldn’t have, I will lead the call for them to be held accountable and face the proper consequences. But I’m not going to fall into the trap of assuming that just because a magic bullet theory is claimed, that I’ll abandon the HSR project. I hope others will refuse to fall into that trap as well.