How the 2012 Business Plan is a Game Changer for High Speed Rail
Since 2008 critics and opponents of the California high speed rail project have demanded a “serious” business plan that took a detailed look at the case for the project, how it would be built, how it would be operated, and how it would be funded. They trashed the previous plans, some of which were produced in haste and without the proper resources. By early 2011 people like the deeply anti-HSR Senator Alan Lowenthal and critics like Senator Joe Simitian were saying that the next business plan had to be a thorough document that laid out a complete and compelling case for the project.
They should have been careful what they were wishing for. Because with the 2012 Business Plan, they’ve got it.
The 2012 Business Plan is a huge leap forward for the California HSR project. It is the in-depth, thorough, complete, and clear document that we didn’t realize we needed until we actually sat down and read it. It’s a very different document than the plans that came before, reflecting a great deal of planning and analysis as to how we actually get high speed rail built. It is very conservative in its assumptions – unnecessarily so in some cases – but that was also done to err on the side of caution.
The result is a strong and solid plan that is a game changer for the project. Since 2008 HSR backers have been caught in limbo, between the passage of Prop 1A, a supportive president but a problematic Congress, and the vagaries of both the planning process and the business plan. This plan advances the HSR project in a significant way by showing the path forward, providing a sensible method by which California finally gets true high speed rail and the enormous economic benefits that come with it.
The document itself is 230 pages long, so I’ll have to summarize the key points as best I can.
From what I can tell, the business plan is to leverage the existing state and federal funding to bring in private capital to build an Initial Operating Segment. That segment would begin with the Initial Construction Segment (the Central Valley segment from Merced to Bakersfield) and continue either north to San José or south to the San Fernando Valley. That IOS would be the first revenue-generating HSR service, and the ridiculously conservative ridership estimates show it would be profitable.
The 2012 Business Plan is extremely specific about how that IOS could be funded. From page 132 (same as page 8-4):
Anticipated funding sources to complete the IOS include:
• Federal funding sources including existing programs and potential new programs related to tax credit bonds, reauthorization and others
• State funding from Proposition 1A bonds
• Local funding sourcesThe IOS will require a mix of funding from federal, state and local sources to support construction in the years 2015 to 2021. Committed funding for this future period is not fully identified. Several potential options exist to fund the completion of an IOS and provide the state with an operating high-speed rail segment.
Following that is a very detailed and long discussion of all the various options. And there is also an acknowledgment of the fact that Congress currently is gripped by an insane mania about deficits, which will eventually pass but for now limits the options for funding in the years 2015 to 2021. Still, it’s an honest and informed discussion.
It is believed by the plan’s authors that the IOS won’t attract much private capital, but once ridership is proven private capital will step up to help complete the rest of the SF-Anaheim section (initially with “blended” service along existing tracks and then later with a full buildout).
This is one of several instances in the plan that strike me as more conservative than is necessary. Private funders were willing to help build the initial operating segment for Florida high speed rail. They even pledged to cover cost overruns. I would suspect that as construction begins on the ICS in the Central Valley, private funders – looking to operate the IOS and pocket some of the revenues – would be willing to come forward and help get the IOS built. Perhaps Governor Jerry Brown and the CHSRA board believe this too, but they are being cautious in this plan, and reasonably so.
One of the truly impressive pieces of the 2012 Business Plan is how it consistently shows the context of HSR – normalizing the project by showing how other infrastructure projects, transit systems and HSR routes operate similarly. For example, I love this from page 110 on ridership:
It is important to be able to consider the ridership projections in context. California’s large population creates tremendous demand for mobility, and the usage levels of the state’s many and diverse transportation systems demonstrates this fact. Some perspective on the ridership projections for California can be gained by comparing the markets that the statewide high-speed rail system will serve with markets being served by systems around the world, as shown in Exhibit 6-17 at the end of this chapter. As shown, the Spanish HSR system serves cities with a combined population of 7.9 million people and has annual ridership of 10 million; the French system serves a combined 15.1 million people and generates 31 million annual riders. California’s system will serve a population base projected to be over 49 million in Full Phase 1. This comparison is not, in and of itself, dispositive, but it uses actual data to show the ridership levels that can be generated from given population levels.
In other words, California’s system compares well to other successful HSR systems around the globe, a point virtually every single HSR critic (hello, Elizabeth) and opponent (how are you doing, Alan) refuses to ever acknowledge.
On that same page the plan compares the projected ridership to the annual ridership of California transit systems. LA Metro’s 2010 ridership is 453 million. SF Muni is 209 million. BART? 108 million. California HSR projections, then, are entirely reasonable.
And under all scenarios, the ridership would be sufficient to generate operating surpluses. That’s even though their ridership assumptions are so conservative they assume Californians will be paying $3.80 for gas in 2033 and that airfares will remain at their 2009 averages of $95. As I showed yesterday, we have plenty of evidence to indicate both costs will be much higher, and therefore HSR ridership will be higher too.
The business plan includes other comparisons, showing how the California Aqueduct, Interstate 5, and other HSR systems around the world were built in phases as money became available. Each had a different business model, but the concept of a phased approach has proved workable in California and around the world. It can work for HSR too.
The deeply conservative nature of this document will make it very difficult for the attacks from folks like Elizabeth Alexis or others to gain much traction. The California High Speed Rail Authority did its homework and then some. With strong backing from Governor Jerry Brown and the state’s business and labor community, it is extremely difficult to imagine that the state legislature will turn against the project now that they have this document in hand. They’re not likely to pay much attention to people who continue to attack this project even after so many of their charges and criticisms have been decisively refuted.
That’s not to say they won’t try. HSR critics and opponents aren’t really motivated by logic or evidence, as we know – they’re motivated either by NIMBYism (consider how many of them live near the Caltrain line) or by an ideological belief that nobody in California will ever ride trains, or in some cases by a combination of the two.
But what we’ve seen since 2008 has been consistent and broad support from the people of California and their legislators for high speed rail. The 2012 Business Plan provides the basis to consolidate that support and get started on construction, with a reasonable and sensible path to providing service from San Francisco to Anaheim by the 2030s. Some people may prefer to continue fighting the future. The rest of us are ready to go out there and build it.
It’s a game changer alright. By loading up the project with enough pork to outrage even a Reform Jew, they’ve managed to sink any prospect of actual high speed rail in California or the rest of the United States for at least another decade.
Outstanding post Robert! So much for “vindication” and all the boondoggle crap of the last 24 hours. Despite a disfunctional Republican Congress, this thing will be built, albeit a little later than we all had hoped. If the “mega-consortia of 100 companies” that Rod Diridon was talking about re private investment comes to fruition, perhaps the IOS becomes San Jose to Sylmar. Like you, I’m still excited about the prospects of HSR. And to people like Elizabeth, Morris, Syno and Alan who will continue to fight this thing to the end, I say this…GET THE HELL OUT OF OUR WAY! The future is coming, and you can’t stop it.
Stephen Smith Reply:
November 2nd, 2011 at 3:09 am
Assuming by “Alan” you mean “Alon,” he was for the project up until this cost projection came out. When you’re turning fellow travelers into villains, you know you have a problem.
swing hanger Reply:
November 2nd, 2011 at 3:47 am
“Alan” refers to Alan Lowenthal, I believe. “Technicals” like Alon are not against HSR, but are critical when they see incompetence in transportation planning and operation.
Alon Levy Reply:
November 2nd, 2011 at 1:13 pm
That’s what I figured, too. I mean, I was basically cheerleading cost underruns until two days ago. And although Tony’s an asshole to a bunch of the technical commenters here, no way he’d include me on the list but not Clem or Richard.
I agree with almost everything in this post and have a new-found respect for the Authority. Except for three problems:
1. Critics will only latch on to the $98.5B number
2. Critics will ignore the facts of this report and continue to spout their nonsense. For example, the ICS will still always be from Borden to Corcoran, and the critics will just cover their ears and eyes when reading the comparisons to Spain and France.
3. The authority needs to reign in the costs and do some serious value engineering on this.
Alon Levy Reply:
November 1st, 2011 at 11:35 pm
Ad 2, the comparisons to France are inappropriate as long as there’s no way for HSR trainsets to continue onward at low speed and serve the central cities. The biggest, LA, is unserviceable because the Tehachapi Loop is at capacity, and even if it weren’t, the speeds would be beatable on a 50 cc scooter. The second biggest, SF, can be made serviceable after appropriately fellating the FRA and UP, at speeds not much better than those of the Tehachapi Loop.
Joey Reply:
November 2nd, 2011 at 9:20 am
What possible comparison could you make to Spain? They have started from Madrid in nearly every case. The only segment that might start operating without that connection is the Basque Y.
flowmotion Reply:
November 2nd, 2011 at 12:04 pm
Given that they’ve finally admitted they can’t build it all in one shot and are taking a long-term phased approach, building the Central Valley ICS appears to be a terrible decision which proves the critics right. Gigantic urban viaducts will be standing there growing weeds for 10 years before they connect anywhere, even in the best case scenario. The opposition will be able to easily spin the (highly-visible) “railroad to nowhere” as monuments to this project’s terrible planning process,while HSRA spends years shaking the tin cup at Congress.
And if Obama or someone thought that spreading pork around in some red districts would bolster GOP support for HSR, that has backfired mightily.
It seems to me that once one acknowledges the project must be built in phases due to funding reasons, the only rational approach is to start in the SF or LA basins. There you can fashion a functioning commuter system during the build-out period, and the level of political support is much higher.
The best thing to hope for now is that the legislature will take this report as the rationale to clean-house at the HSRA. They need to hit the reset button on this before anyone starts pouring concrete in Corcoran, or HSR is dead-meat.
synonymouse Reply:
November 3rd, 2011 at 10:57 am
flowmotion, your analysis is spot-on.
Peter Reply:
November 3rd, 2011 at 11:14 am
“Gigantic urban viaducts”
Not any more. Check out the more recent designs for Fresno. The only planned viaducts are at the southern end, where they have to cut over the criscrossing freight lines. The rest is at-grade or trenched (for just over a mile).
You know Robert, this cheerleading’s really getting to me. The final product might be great, what what does it matter—Californians are going to have to wait over twenty years to reap those benefits. In the meantime, the business plan suggests spending something like an average $130-140 million per mile to get there, well beyond the cost in peer countries. And as Clem has repeatedly outlined, at least in the Bay Area much of the expense comes from poor coordination and the mother of all principal-agent problems with PB, not any intrinsic need for expensive infrastructure. And I can’t express any confidence in CHSRA’s ability to get competent investors aboard—who’d want to invest in a state with an utterly dysfunctional planning culture?
Like Paulus, I am incredibly pissed at California for whizzing all over the future of high-speed passenger rail in this country (I live in Chicago). And cheerleading doesn’t help. A serious advocate for high speed rail would concentrate more on getting real high-speed service up and running, praising the Authority when it does well, defending it when it is wronged or criticizing it when it wrongs itself. California’s mess is purely their own creation—a supportive government isn’t willing to take a serious look at a poorly-managed project and get it on a path to an economical and timely completion, and supportive citizens are unwilling to make the push to get them there. It’s disgusting that the one true HSR project to survive the Tea Party takeover in 2010 will probably be done in by its own incompetence.
Robert, I think you’re making a mistake when you say that,
First, outside the business plan, both the HSRA and potential investors indicate that until the ICS is in place, no private funding will come forth. Investors are uninterested in Bakersfield-Fresno. They might be persuaded to help fund LA-Fresno, but it’s unlikely.
Second, private investors such as JR Central were willing to cover potential cost overruns and operating losses in Florida out of desire to establish a foothold in the US. The same logic could apply to California, but now they’d have to risk far more money – if Bakersfield-LA could be brought down to the original cost projections, it would still require about $5 billion upfront and higher maintenance costs. Indeed, JR Central’s next target is Texas, not California. (California is JR East territory, but JR East hasn’t come forward with an offer.)
And third, the California project is run worse than the Florida project. Florida was from the start a project geared around international standards and competition among multinationals, like Taiwan, Russia, or in the future Brazil. California isn’t. The design is captive to PB and local construction contractors, and officials in the Bay Area, Orange County, and now LA County treat it as a money tree to hang their local projects on.
Anyway, Japan said it would put half the money. This probably doesn’t mean half of whatever amount California says (though, the overdesign seems so grotesque it was probably intended to swindle investors and governments this way). Try to design the system around getting half the original budget from Japan; with $9b from Prop 1A and $3.3b from the feds, it works out to a deficit of about $9b, one fifth the budget, but with the new numbers it’s up to $65b, two thirds of the budget (maybe a little less since the cost estimates assume high inflation, but it’s only about a first-and-a-half-order effect).
Useless Reply:
November 3rd, 2011 at 8:30 am
@ Alon Levy
> Anyway, Japan said it would put half the money
That proposal had a cap of $22 billion. And the financial situation of Japanese government is bad enough, they just lost $500 billion in the latest yen value intervention.
Tony d. Reply:
November 3rd, 2011 at 9:43 am
Japan will be just fine. By the way, how does the $22 billion translate in 2033 dollars? Perhaps its more like $44 billion. Its dishonest to take today’s values/numbers and put them side by side with 2033′s.
Robert, I’ve been reading this blog since 2008. It got me interested in the project, I voted for the ballot initiative, and then I spent tons of time reading and posting about local transit and HSR in Los Angeles and around the country. But with this cost escalation to $100 billion, mainly due to unnecessary tunnels and viaducts and other nonsense, I don’t know that I can support the project. And with the cheerleader character of the last few posts, I’m not sure that I will continue subscribing to your blog. Sorry.
I love this project to death. HSR can and will work in California. I just can’t see how it’s politically possible at this cost.
My question is why is this so expensive? How did we get from 33B to 49B to 98.5B?? How do other countries get projects like this done for 1/3rd the cost?
This development saddens me greatly. While I would be willing to pay my part, I highly doubt those in power will sign off on this.
Sad day indeed.
Alon Levy Reply:
November 2nd, 2011 at 12:06 am
33-to-42 came from updating the numbers from 2006 dollars to YOE dollars, plus one real overrun on LA-Anaheim that has since gotten descoped from the blended plan (namely, tunneling under the two-track ROW instead of sharing tracks). The 42-to-98 overrun came mainly from adding viaducts and tunnels, most for plain agency turf reasons or unwillingness to do eminent domain where it’s cheap, with a minority for honest environmental reasons.
Jack Reply:
November 2nd, 2011 at 12:23 am
So when do the Japanese/Chinese come in and say they can do it for $20B?
swing hanger Reply:
November 2nd, 2011 at 12:30 am
The Chinese maybe. I wouldn’t take them up on their offer, for obvious reasons.
Alon Levy Reply:
November 2nd, 2011 at 12:43 am
The Chinese can’t do 700 km for $20 billion in perfectly flat terrain; China is not a low-construction cost country once you adjust everything for PPP. $30 billion, sure, but then you need to add extra for the tunnels.
Useless Reply:
November 2nd, 2011 at 6:03 am
@ Jack
> So when do the Japanese/Chinese come in and say they can do it for $20B?
Japanese can’t.
Chinese was able to pull this off because the government owns all land(Real estate owners own the buildings on top of the land, but land itself belongs to the government and you lease land to build your stuff over it), and was able to evict residents at will. Also sub-standard material was used to construct the railways ASAP.
swing hanger Reply:
November 2nd, 2011 at 6:24 am
”sub-standard material”
No kidding. From a bridge in Shanghai. Scary.
http://blog-imgs-23-origin.fc2.com/k/a/n/kanasoku/Img269280693.jpg
Peter Reply:
November 2nd, 2011 at 6:53 am
404.
Joey Reply:
November 2nd, 2011 at 9:26 am
The Spanish are the ones with consistently low construction costs. They could probably do it for $20b.
Useless Reply:
November 2nd, 2011 at 6:01 am
@ Jack
> My question is why is this so expensive?
Each day adds tens of millions of dollars in additional cost in terms of labor, financing cost, insurance, etc.
Alon Levy Reply:
November 2nd, 2011 at 2:17 pm
More than 80% of the real cost escalation is additional viaducts and tunnels, rather than increases in unit costs.
VBobier Reply:
November 2nd, 2011 at 7:19 pm
Question is how many of the viaducts and tunnels are really necessary? I can see both in the mountains on what’s essentially a new route over the tehachapi mountains, but areas in the CV? Not unless absolutely needed, In the Peninsula, sure, just keep the height down to a minimum, like the height of a freeway overpass, excluding the height of the catenary supports of course.
Alon Levy Reply:
November 2nd, 2011 at 7:26 pm
No, in the CV the costs have escalated little. The Tehachapi tunnels are necessary (the cheaper alternative was ruled out by further environmental study), but the other viaducts and tunnels are for the most part unnecessary. The Millbrae tunnel is stupid; so are the viaducts on the approaches to Diridon Intergalactic. And the Bay Area, where the new infrastructure is the most pointless, is also where the cost escalation has been the worst: a factor of 2.5.
Andre Peretti Reply:
November 2nd, 2011 at 7:49 pm
“How do other countries get projects like this done for 1/3rd the cost?”
Because in other countries passenger rail is considered just as any other means of transport, like airlines or buses. If a line is found to be useful, it is built as quicky as possible at the lowest cost.
In the US, the prime purpose of a rail project seems to be to create as many jobs as possible. When Scott Walker cancelled the Wisconsin project, the critics didn’t say “he killed a train we wanted”, but “he killed jobs we badly needed”. People cried on the lost jobs, not on the lost train.
When American Airlines have to decide what planes they need, they don’t hire Boeing or Airbus as consultants. They have independent consultants define their needs and then put the pressure on Boeing and Airbus to get the best deal.
Rail is different. CHSRA hires PB, a construction company, as consultant. If PB are then also involved in the construction of the line, I doubt they will try very hard to keep costs low or build quickly.
In France, if any link is discovered between a consultant and the firm that gets a contract, it creates a major scandal and heads roll. We’ve had politicians and CEOs jailed for that sort of thing.
Sigh. $98B is death. RIP.
Alex M. Reply:
November 2nd, 2011 at 9:57 pm
Well, sure it is, with that attitude.
Thanks Robert for the good news and excellent summary and analysis.
Tony d. Reply:
November 2nd, 2011 at 7:15 am
Agreed. As for some here, I guess if you state a lie over and over again, eventually it will become the truth.
Robert, I like the tone of the piece and the optimism, but the CAHSR Authority really blew it today. Nobody is going to sign up for this project if it’s going to take 21 years to build 520 miles. No one. Not even myself, a huge high-speed rail supporter in the middle of the HSR debate (Fresno) thinks that SF to LA by 2033 isn’t going to work. The Authority needs to go back to the assumptions made and assume funding WILL be there for completion of the Phase 1 by 2025-2027. This would save over $20 billion. If this revision isn’t made, well, I can’t support this plan.
When your most vocal supporters are coming out against this business plan, you know high-speed rail in California has a problem.
Reduce the construction period, don’t assume 3% inflation when this year it was only 1%. The $98 billion number is going to kill any funding, it’s simply too daunting in the face of the financial situation we are in today in this country. I simply won’t work.
swing hanger Reply:
November 2nd, 2011 at 4:07 am
2033. And I thought 2020 for Tokyo-Sapporo shinkansen and 2027 for maglev Tokyo-Nagoya was far off. I understand building infrastructure is a long term proposition, but I’ll almost be collecting social security when this thing is done.
Robert, I know it’s a bad time for transportation in this country, and it’s been reflected in your posts since late 2010, but please stop your biased cheerleading of this project. (Not a personal attack, but I will admit it’d be nice if you’d have some writers that could talk about the technical and not just the political aspects of the project.) Seriously, this revised plan is going to have massive repercussions that could entirely screw over not just CAHSR, but rail in general in America.
This is not an ends justify the means project as you make it out to be. There is no way I want the state to end up like Montreal after the 1976 Olympics, and if CAHSR can’t fix things ASAP, give the money to build the Wilshire Subway, which is far more cost-effective and could have as much benefit as HSR in half the amount of time.
Sure, this business plan is a game changer in that it just killed the HSR system. At $98 billion, it is a non-starter.
DanM Reply:
November 2nd, 2011 at 8:01 am
For once we actually agree on something….
Here is a possible opportunity–the chance to kick out PB. . .
Some years back, I got to see photos of the (then) under-construction original TGV line. What impressed me most about the photos was how it just looked like an under-construcition highway.
The only difference between a modern railroad and a highway is somewhat heavier bridges, a different superstructure (tracks instead of pavement), and in this case, a somewhat straighter right-of-way. Maybe tamping fills is a little more important and requires a little more care, but otherwise, moving dirt is moving dirt. Start asking questions like this, or more importantly, get the politicians asking questions like this, and see what kind of results you might get.
I would nominate that, in view of PB’s alleged abuses, that California could do well to make this a true state project, with much of the civil engineering being done in-house.
I would bet there are a bunch of civil engineers at Caltran who would love to transfer over to the HSR project; it would be a chance to work on something big and “game changing.” Just make sure it’s some of the (usually) younger guys who still have some ambition and some passion for what they do. . .
Important question, though–are the politicians smart enough to know that moving dirt is moving dirt?
Andy M. Reply:
November 2nd, 2011 at 7:32 am
True, and that’s why you may have heard of an automobile lobby being anti HSR and you may have heard of an oil lobby being HSR but you’ll never hear of a roadbuilding lobby being anti-HSR.
Mike Reply:
November 2nd, 2011 at 10:27 am
Stealing some good Caltrans engineers to work on HSR could be a good idea, but I don’t see how it fixes the problem of scope creep. Drawing out the plans for an HSR berm may be pretty darn similar to doing it for a highway, but that’s not where the costs come in. The costs come in the previous step, in which you decide what kind of structure do you need at each segment, and to what standard do you design it. Caltrans engineers won’t have the experience (or the confidence) to pick the right tradeoff between cost/performance, so they’ll default to overdesigning everything. Hell, that’s what they do with highways too, and that’s a field in which they purportedly have expertise! I don’t think it matters who the engineers are, what matters is who are the engineering managers. And the authority desperately needs a cadre of highly experienced, ass-kicking engineering managers on it’s own payroll.
Can another company step up and say: “Okay PB told you this; here is how much we can do it for.” Isn’t that why there is competitive bidding?
William Reply:
November 2nd, 2011 at 10:31 am
PB only provides engineering estimate from the top level, of course any construction company can bid lower than that.
Clem Reply:
November 2nd, 2011 at 10:56 am
PB sets the scope, i.e. what will be built and where. For example, they say a single-track cut-and-cover tunnel shall be built under the Millbrae station. Nobody anywhere in this process has an opportunity to say that’s a stupid design. When it goes out to bid, it could come in for 1.7 billion instead of their 1.9 billion estimate. The correct engineering solution in this location costs less than a hundred million.
Donk Reply:
November 2nd, 2011 at 11:25 am
So what is in it for PB to completely over-engineer everything? Is it because their consultants can bill more hours working on the more complex designs? Or because they get kick-backs from the companies that construct the segments? I have read many of Mylnarik’s posts on these matters, but he doesn’t make any sense.
Obviously the Authority is the one that is ultimately held accountable for all of this. So I assume they have the authority to provide some guidance to PB, ie to tell them to value-engineer and take a BART track instead of building a tunnel under the Millbrae station. What is the solution, should we all write letters to CASHRA? This is really getting ridiculous.
Mike Reply:
November 2nd, 2011 at 12:06 pm
Certainly the incentive of more billable hours encourages PB (or any engineering contractor) to push a more complex design. But I think with PB, it’s also a cultural thing, as in “We’re PB, godammit! We do big, complex projects that nobody else can do! Simple, low cost solutions are for losers.”
The Authority does have the responsibility and authority to manage PBs work, but the Authority lacks the staff and expertise to do so. So they rely on yet another contractor (TY Lin) to double check the work of others. But it seems that TY Lin isn’t really digging in to the major engineering decisions that drive costs.
Richard Mlynarik Reply:
November 2nd, 2011 at 12:32 pm
Ah yes. TY Lin. “Bay Bridge East Span“. Only 500% over budget … and counting. Just the chaps we need for this tough assignment.
Mike Reply:
November 2nd, 2011 at 2:33 pm
On the other had, we could look at the new Benicia-Martinez bridge, designed by the public-spirited, non-profit engineers at Caltrans. It also came in about 500% over original estimates. There’s plenty of failure to go around. I’ve got no problem with PB engineers doing the design work, but I do have a problem with the fact that they are not managed by strong and experienced engineering project managers.
synonymouse Reply:
November 2nd, 2011 at 1:19 pm
The CHSRA is not going to take any BART property because in effect it is BART. The business plan should not have been announced at the California Railway Museum but at BART hq. Any resemblance between the CHSRA and a real railway is purely coincidental. The genetic proximity of BART and the CHSRA on the other hand is perfectly intentional.
How does this work? PB=BART/MTC. PB builds “duorail”, aka regional mass transit not Abo Canyons. Everything has to be in tunnel or aerial, in other words acceptable for monorail or maglev, which is what PB really wants to build but is not yet ready for prime time. Point being PB, like Bechtel before it, is embarrassed to have anything to do with conventional,”obsolete”, old-fashioned rr’s. PB is still living in the Brutalist, Jetsons sixties and always will.
Peter Reply:
November 2nd, 2011 at 2:44 pm
PB was in charge of planning and design of THSR.
And what’s with the monorail and maglev crap? Your posts would be much more believable if they were supported by facts or some sort of rational, even believable, thoughts.
Alon Levy Reply:
November 2nd, 2011 at 4:56 pm
PB does fine work outside the Anglosphere. It’s similar to how Skanska overcharges New York and bribes officials in Argentina but does decent construction in Sweden.
joe Reply:
November 2nd, 2011 at 7:54 pm
Or Ikea.
We’re crippling government oversight and whining about the runaway private sector.
swing hanger Reply:
November 2nd, 2011 at 8:30 pm
Said consultants/contractors know how to work the system to their advantage, based on local conditions:
http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2010/results
synonymouse Reply:
November 2nd, 2011 at 9:24 pm
My point is that PB does not want to build a railroad that is genuinely value-engineered. It wants to gold-plate.
You are asking PB to go against its grain. It certainly appears to me, given their track record of the past few years, they will only consider any modifications to the current scheme if forced to
against their will and then only piecemeal.
When they propose to cost out Tejon, I-5, Altamont then I’ll believe PB has seen the light. Or at least a flicker.
Meantime I’ll be amused by whatever nonsense emanates from Moonbeam to spin this scandal.
Richard Mlynarik Reply:
November 2nd, 2011 at 12:11 pm
In which alternate universe “America” does this “competitive bidding” of which you speak occur?
joe Reply:
November 2nd, 2011 at 7:57 pm
It works pretty well for road projects in California which are being bid well under estimated cost.
Alon Levy Reply:
November 2nd, 2011 at 8:03 pm
This isn’t as positive as you’d think, at least if it’s working the same way as in New York. In New York, one of the perennial problems is dishonest contractors (and not consultants); the problem is that due to the state’s lowest-bid rules the specs are so byzantine that competent contractors don’t bother with them and instead get private-sector work. Now that there’s no private-sector work, a bunch of Second Avenue Subway contracts are coming in at 50% under estimated cost. It’s not enough to make the line fall back in with the original budget, but it keeps a lid on the cost overruns.
The problem is of course that the recession won’t last forever, and eventually the private sector will be able to make a profit without dealing with the government.
Joseph E Reply:
November 6th, 2011 at 1:57 am
Road projects are a great example. Consider 405 – let’s tear down a bunch of existing bridges and cut into a mountainside to add 1 lane, for $1 billion dollars, thru the Sepulveda pass! For that price we could have built a whole new subway alignment under the pass.
No one suggests just turning 1 or 2 standard lanes into a carpool lane. Cost? About 1/1000th the current project, with 90% of the capacity.
To all you people whining about the 2033 timeline and throwing in the towel – I don’t see a problem with providing a conservative estimate. This is the worst-case scenario, and is a well thought out, viable business plan that is intended to gain some credibility for the Authority. The whole report was extremely conservative to appease the Negative Nancies, like Elizabeth Alexis and Alan Lowenthal. What they should have also done is provide an alternate, more optimistic timeline and cost based on value engineering and higher projected gas prices.
Clearly, since they have been looking into the Grapevine route and Altamont options, there is a movement to reduce the costs from the projected numbers in the business plan, and I suspect that they are not yet ready to go with these numbers. But I still can’t understand why they have to have so many goddamn viaducts and tunnels. You would think that if PB actually wants to continue working on the project, that they would provide a somewhat viable plan that could actually be built instead of getting mothballed by the taxpayers.
Tony D. Reply:
November 2nd, 2011 at 12:25 pm
Correction to your otherwise excellent post Donk: The Authority hasn’t been looking at an Altamont option vs the already chosen Pacheco. Hence “Merced to San Jose IOS.”
Alon Levy Reply:
November 2nd, 2011 at 1:22 pm
The problem is that the Nattering Nabobs of Negativity have been complaining primarily about cost overruns. The 2012 business plan admits to huge cost overruns, coming almost entirely (>80%) from increases in scope, which in turn come almost entirely from overbuilding and agency turf battles. The plan punts on ridership (okay), but on costs it for the most part proves the NNNs right.
A lot of people in this forum keep bringing up value engineering as some magical device, like compound interest or something. But in reality all value engineering has done in California is bring down the scope back to the original cost estimate. It means doing what should have been done all along. In the Central Valley, they’ve done it, because the budget is an absolute constraint and if they can’t build something that at least looks nice, they won’t be able to build more. Elsewhere, they haven’t done so. And on the Peninsula, where the cost overruns are the highest, value engineering means something like giving Clem dictatorial power over planning (not really, but at least doing what he proposes).
Donk Reply:
November 2nd, 2011 at 2:09 pm
Ok…so it sounds like your point is that they have already “value engineered” the ICS, and that the Authority royally fucked up by not providing “value engineered numbers” for the rest of the system, right? If so, then wouldn’t this be solved by “magically” performing value engineering on the rest of the route to get the numbers down a little lower? Or are you saying that value engineering is not possible, and that we are totally fucked?
Alon Levy Reply:
November 2nd, 2011 at 2:16 pm
It’s possible, but only if people seriously dangle cancellation over their heads. They’re not going to cut costs out of their own goodwill. The only reason I think it’s at all feasible is that private money is not going to come forward until there’s a workable IOS in place (i.e. a superset of LA-Bakersfield), which means they may be compelled to cut costs rather than hope for local or private money to swindle.
nslander Reply:
November 2nd, 2011 at 3:19 pm
Thank you for shedding actual light.
Robert, I’m curious. At what price would you say that CHSR is a bad idea and should be stopped?
Peter Reply:
November 2nd, 2011 at 9:30 am
When the cost of NOT building HSR is lower than building HSR?
Mara Reply:
November 2nd, 2011 at 9:42 am
Is that a rhetorical question, or do you have hard numbers to share?
This project has very clearly gotten to the point where it can no longer be promoted based on aspirational arguments, like “green” or “jobs” or “sprawl” or “we can’t fall behind China or Europe.”
Derek Reply:
November 2nd, 2011 at 10:47 am
HSR: $98.5 billion
Expanding airports and freeways to move the same number of people: $171 billion.
It’s in the business plan. Go read it.
Mara Reply:
November 2nd, 2011 at 11:39 am
I have, and here is the reference for the $171Billion figure: Footnote #10:
Source: Parsons Brinckerhoff. October 2011. “Technical Memorandum: Cost of Alternative Modes to High-Speed Rail, October 2011”
Do you see a potential conflict of interest in having PB create its own comparison figures? Derek, please share an an independently derived estimate from a respected source.
Derek Reply:
November 2nd, 2011 at 11:57 am
Mara, until you can provide an independently derived estimate from a respected source, the $171 billion figure stands.
Mara Reply:
November 2nd, 2011 at 12:19 pm
Are you suggesting a $98Billion decision be predicated on a counter estimate made by the party that stands to make the most money from the project? Moreover, PB’s estimates supporting their mega-projects have a very poor track record (e.g. Big Dig). CA and US taxpayers should not be so easily swayed.
Tony D. Reply:
November 2nd, 2011 at 12:27 pm
So again, provide some hard numbers and estimates from a respected source rather than blather a bunch of nonsense!
Peter Reply:
November 2nd, 2011 at 12:35 pm
Uh, how does PB stand to “make the most money from the project?” They design it, not build it. Them running up the construction tab does nothing for them.
Richard Mlynarik Reply:
November 2nd, 2011 at 12:56 pm
The consultant mafiosi tab, with not a single shovel of dirt turned on this fraudulent scam, is rapidly approaching $700 million of your US Dollars. Nice work if you can get it. Even icer work if you can get to do it over again. And over and over.
joe Reply:
November 2nd, 2011 at 8:14 pm
Government is dumb, Contractors are corrupt. It’s pointless over and over and over again.
flowmotion Reply:
November 2nd, 2011 at 12:39 pm
Here’s the PB report, if anyone’s interested:
http://www.cahighspeedrail.ca.gov/assets/0/152/302/321/3fad5c4a-f462-4f2b-836c-5e45d1e379a4.pdf
Assumption is 116M HSR passengers per year.
My superficial criticism is that it ignores HSR’s ability to generate trips. Meaning, not that many people would drive to Fresno even if Hwy 99 was a 10 lane freeway with equivalent “people carrying” capacity.
The other aspect is that no community will “trade” highway or airport funding for HSR funding (never mind there isn’t even a mechanism to do so.) So a good chunk of that $171B would be spent anyway.
Richard Mlynarik Reply:
November 2nd, 2011 at 1:03 pm
Some Very Special reasoning gets them there:
Hey, if we have 38 trains per hour and 23 hours of operation and and 1100 seats per train we can dial the ridership up from 11 to 13!
“12 trains per hour in each direction” = deliberate, bald-faced, deliberate, fraudulent, self-justifying, self-enriching lying by the consultants.
Donk Reply:
November 2nd, 2011 at 1:16 pm
If you are such an expert on all of this, then why don’t you come up with potential solutions once in a while instead of bitching about everything and at everyone and making no sense. Many of your posts are comical, but comical in the irrational, crotchety sense like Homer Simpson’s or George Costanza’s dads. You seem to know a lot and could help the project if you were to channel your energy somewhere more useful.
flowmotion Reply:
November 2nd, 2011 at 1:44 pm
Richard has posted a bunch of constructive stuff about this project, but it was back in 1998 on Usenet.
Caelestor Reply:
November 2nd, 2011 at 2:39 pm
Basically, no one has listened to his good ideas for 15 years, so he’s been forced to assume a bombastic personality to get his points across. In a way, he’s half in furious anger, half in despair.
Derek Reply:
November 2nd, 2011 at 1:26 pm
Richard, those are some serious accusations. Do you have any evidence to help prove you are not committing libel?
Joey Reply:
November 2nd, 2011 at 1:41 pm
No one outside of Japan has even close to enough demand for more than 4tph on any city pair.
The 5 minute minimum headway is necessary to facilitate overtakes, but that doesn’t mean that a train will pass any given point every 5 minutes.
flowmotion Reply:
November 2nd, 2011 at 1:57 pm
How is it libel? The report basically admits they were trying to create a “worst case scenario”.
“The second major change in assumptions was a switch from estimating the needed
capacity based on ridership to estimating it based on equivalent “people-carrying”
capacity”
I would suggest an honest study compare peak capacity vs peak capacity, because nobody builds roads/airports based on the maximum number of people who could possibly travel at midnight.
Caelestor Reply:
November 2nd, 2011 at 2:37 pm
@Joey, not to disagree with your point, but Taiwan HSR is doing pretty well in amounts of service offered (mainly because the entire country is heavily urbanized). 4-5 tph during peak.
But the point still stands. If the NEC can’t even run 4 tph with its far larger urban metropolis, then CAHSR can’t and shouldn’t. 2 or 3 tph should suffice (lower operating costs, higher profits).
Derek Reply:
November 2nd, 2011 at 2:40 pm
Joey wrote: “No one outside of Japan has even close to enough demand for more than 4tph on any city pair.”
In 2033?
flowmotion wrote: “How is it libel? The report basically admits they were trying to create a ‘worst case scenario’.”
Because Richard called it “lying.”
adirondacker12800 Reply:
November 2nd, 2011 at 3:16 pm
If the NEC can’t even run 4 tph
It does every weekday afternoon. An Acela between New York and Washington DC. Two regionals between NY and DC and a Keystone between NY and Harrisburg.
Alon Levy Reply:
November 2nd, 2011 at 4:55 pm
The NEC has service so terrible that a fair number of people are voluntarily choosing cheaper but more masochistic forms of transportation.
Caelestor Reply:
November 2nd, 2011 at 5:26 pm
Misleading claim: only during 7:00-8:00 A.M. and 4:00-5:00 are there 4 tph leaving NYC. Also considering the size of NYC and Philadelphia, demand and/or train length should be much higher.
You’re a contrarian, aren’t you?
Derek Reply:
November 2nd, 2011 at 6:18 pm
How is that misleading?
Alon Levy Reply:
November 2nd, 2011 at 6:48 pm
On the other hand, Amtrak is about half as fast as CAHSR would’ve been. It’s really stupid to compare NEC ridership to HSR ridership. The closest thing in terms of metro area populations to just one half of the NEC is Seoul-Busan, and the ridership there is 38 million a year, more than three times the ridership of the NEC.
adirondacker12800 Reply:
November 2nd, 2011 at 7:45 pm
Current schedules show 4 between 2:00 and 2:59 leaving New York for Philadelphia. They are never going to run 4 tph between 2:00 AM and 2:59AM even if cars and airplanes are banned. There’s one once an hour-ish between NY and Albany. The long distance trains aren’t in the Northeast Corridor schedules, and I’m not going to go look to see which hours have an Acela, a Regional, a Keystone and long distance train in them.
Alon there’s always going to be masochists, it’s not really worth 20-30 bucks to sit on a bus for four hours on a good day 6-7 on a bad day when a Regional will get you there quicker. And you are SOL if you want to go from Trenton to Baltimore. Or Newark to Newark. Or Metropark to New Carrollton. Or Wilmington to ….. Amtrak fantasy #47 is restoring service between West Trenton and Bound Brook. I could see a train once an hour at peak between New York and Philadelphia via Plainfield… that would be 5…. last I checked neither Plainfield or New Brunswick are in Japan…
Clem Reply:
November 2nd, 2011 at 7:58 pm
I’m always amazed that we can get bogged down in such dorky details when the point is 4 trains per hour is a more reasonable figure than 12, which we might finally all agree is a total fantasy.
Alon Levy Reply:
November 2nd, 2011 at 8:07 pm
Adirondacker: not worth it, but in my social circle even total non-masochists ride the buses sometimes out of cost. My guess based on looking at Megabus and Bolt schedules and assuming 70-80% seat occupancy is that on NY-Boston and NY-DC, Megabus and Bolt combined are about even on ridership with Amtrak.
Clem: sure, 12 is a fantasy, but at full buildout and with much higher gas prices and more congestion than today, 8 sounds reasonable.
Reality Check Reply:
November 2nd, 2011 at 5:32 pm
116 million passengers is a pretty insane projection. If HSR captures 100% of all air passengers that travel between points within the state of California, including the coastal markets that aren’t even on the HSR line, thats only 12.4 million passengers a year. It won’t capture all of them because about 20% of them with HSR access will still fly and others without access to HSR will continue to fly because they won’t have access to HSR. If you think 116 million riders is a ralistic number, I want some of what you’re smoking.
To say HSR is going to capture nearly 10 times that of air travel is just insane. Especially now that the cost, and presumably fares, have just doubled. What’s even more damning is that those 12.5 million passengers represent just 19% of all air passengers from all passenger airports in the state. Which means that those 4 runways will have to be built anyway because airports over the long term see about 2.5-3% growth per year, in essence, HSR gives airports a 5-7 year respit but now HSR is 14 years late.
Clem Reply:
November 2nd, 2011 at 10:16 pm
It’s not 116M trips per year. It’s 116M bums in seats passing any given point along the line. Each seat may be used by several bums, so the assumed number of yearly trips is well north of 116M. It says so in the PB memo.
A couple questions come to mind:
Is there enough political interest to put Prop 1A back on the ballot?
Is there enough political interest to reconceive the CHSRA scheme and quash the influence peddlers?
Jerry Brown must be in a quandary. He is a kinda Papandreou – he has pissed off his unions and now this scandal.
Derek Reply:
November 2nd, 2011 at 10:52 am
Let’s put three things on the ballot:
1. Build HSR ($98 billion)
2. Expand airports and freeways to move the same number of people ($171 billion)
3. Implement demand side congestion management to permanently eliminate traffic congestion even if capacity never increases (~$1 billion)
If this is a game-changer, what in what game has it changed? What event will have a different outcome as a result of issuing this plan (as opposed to copying and pasting Mehdi’s old plan with the numbers tweaked)?
As far as I know, the next step in the process is having the legislature authorize the issuance of bonds to match the Federal funding for the ICS. Is that now more or less likely to happen? Or was it always going to happen as long as something printed in hard covers was issued under the name of a business plan? Are there other decision points scheduled in the near term?
RisenMessiah Reply:
November 3rd, 2011 at 9:46 am
It seems like the “GameChange” aspect is really that the new business plan is something MTC and BART can get behind.
It’s going to leverage the use of the Altamont Corridor Express to create a regional rail system that is 100% compatible with BART extensions in Stockton, Livermore, and San Jose. Once you have a way into San Jose from the new track in Merced, Fresno, and Bakersfield you are in business.
I also don’t doubt that we are going to see something along these lines for Desert Xpress in the south….I can see it now…..
synonymouse Reply:
November 3rd, 2011 at 10:18 am
Said BART extensions are to be standard gauge OCS?
RisenMessiah Reply:
November 3rd, 2011 at 10:34 am
No… By compatible I mean, BART wants ACE and IOS service to allow passengers to detrain in their stations. Right now, ACE and the San Joaquins don’t offer that except in sunny Richmond. But if you link ACE to Merced (somehow) and then run IOS Service using DMUs along the new ACE line to San Jose…you get a market snapshot and the chance for passengers to connect both in downtown San Jose to BART but also Livermore.
What BART gets is less competition for the East Bay and SF to Stockton, which I am sure it has designs on because of land availability.
I’m betting that this model is going to be repeated in the South using Desert Express. DX will run trains from Victorville over Cajon (at first) into San Bernardino which will give it access to Metrolink. LA Metro gets the connecting passenger traffic…DX gets a temporary way to sort this all out.
synonymouse Reply:
November 3rd, 2011 at 10:50 am
Over the long run I consider Sin City dead in the water, as all the states will legalize casinos. LV’s residual raison d’etre is minimal.
The multiple incompatibilities between BART tech and everybody else in the known railroad world is a vexatious problem. But of course that is exactly what Bechtel and the SP intended.
RisenMessiah Reply:
November 3rd, 2011 at 1:11 pm
The Native Americans don’t want gambling everywhere, and will slowly reverse the tide you are seeing. Also, that tide is largely due to the fact that taxing gambling is a very insidious way to raise revenue.
adirondacker12800 Reply:
November 3rd, 2011 at 1:29 pm
For the gazillionth time, people have lots of reasons to go to metro area with 2 million people.
There’s more Las Vegas than slot machines. The local bingo hall with slots is never going to compete with all of the other attractions available in Las Vegas. You are never going to host Comdex, not that Comdex is being run anymore, into the 1000 or so hotel rooms in greater Wasco.
The slot machines, tables, hotel rooms, restaurants, striptease clubs all need to be staffed. The staff needs to buy groceries, get the car fixed, go to the doctor or dentist now and then. All together there’s two million people in Las Vegas who get the urge to go visit their relatives in Bakersfield and Fullerton. And the relatives in Bakersfield and Fullerton get the urge to visit the relatives in Las Vegas. All of them buy things which means the sales people from all over the world need to get there.
RisenMessiah Reply:
November 3rd, 2011 at 1:50 pm
I think Synonymouse had a bad experience at the poker table some years back…
Peter Reply:
November 3rd, 2011 at 2:08 pm
Not to mention a bad experience with BART and the MTC.
RisenMessiah Reply:
November 3rd, 2011 at 4:03 pm
Yeah I’ve always wondered what Richard does with that barbed-wire dildo of his….
here in the uk the govt is expected to make an announcement in mid december about hs2. it looks like it will get the go ahead. london birmingham will take 49 minutes and will open in 2O26 at a cost of at least £17 billion and the two “branches” to leeds and manchester will cost another £16 billion. london to these cities will take about 1 hr 15 mins not bad for a 2OO mile trip !
whilst at least £35 billion is a lot of money and more per mile then in france or spain the govt has calculated that the minimum economic benefit is at least £2 for every pound spent. the important thing is not how much it costs but what the benefits are. we must also remember that as with california the cost of not building hsr is far from zero ! and if a railway project can escalate in cost then so can any other transport project.
finally i find it galling that critics of hsr in the usa and uk complain about cost escalations of hs2 when it is partly due to the extra tunnels and mitigations that those same critics have demanded !
Alon Levy Reply:
November 2nd, 2011 at 1:38 pm
It’s not just “more per mile than in France or Spain.” It’s more per mile than anywhere else. It’s about £100 million per kilometer, which is on a par with nearly-100%-tunneled HSR in Italy, and higher than the just-released numbers in California ($90 million/km in 2010 dollars, $130m/km in hypothetical-with-high-inflation YOE dollars). In Germany when they can’t build lines for under $50 million/km it’s considered bad.
So let me just ask this of the naysayes and critics: WHAT THE HELL DO YOU WANT TO SEE HAPPEN!? Besides nothing of course. I imagine those of you here that are 60+ years of age wouldn’t mind seeing the status quo remain; who gives a damn about my childrens future or California 20-30+ years out (I aint gonna be here). But what about those who do support HSR in theory but have already thrown in the towel on this thing. Perhaps a “splitting” of the bond monies between NorCal and SoCal? Caltrain/ACE upgrades in the north and Metrolink in the South? What is it? Again, besides nothing which will cost $170+ billion?
My hope for the current scheme remains in the form of private/foreign investments, a new Congress in November 2012, possible infrastructure bank, local increases in gas tax, etc. But if it absolutely can’t happen, let’s start hearing some constructive alternatives here rather than the same ole bull $hit.
Alon Levy Reply:
November 2nd, 2011 at 1:33 pm
What I want to see happen is California HSR build for under $40 billion in today’s money.
Joey Reply:
November 2nd, 2011 at 1:38 pm
+1. This should be completely doable, given remotely sane engineering characteristics.
StevieB Reply:
November 2nd, 2011 at 11:34 pm
Will you accept the $16 billion in contingencies and $27.5 billion in inflation costs in the business plan? These monies are for a worst case and may or may not be spent.
Alon Levy Reply:
November 3rd, 2011 at 12:29 am
I can’t speak for others, but I have always included only the constant-dollar $65 billion figure. I live in the real world, not the nominal world ;).
jim Reply:
November 3rd, 2011 at 3:49 am
Contingency funds are always spent. They are never sized for a worst case. They are sized for a most probable case (actually for the sum of risk exposures, which are the mathematical expectations of cost of risks).
nick Reply:
November 2nd, 2011 at 2:37 pm
how much are the alternatives to high speed rail that is the question. how much land take would more highways take ? how much pollution would more flights cause ? how will you ever reduce the imported oil dependency ? more highways with more cars arent the answer to an ever populated world. if we accept that the population of california will grow not shrink and that people will want to travel in the future then high speed rail over medium distances is by far and away the least polluting.
Caelestor Reply:
November 2nd, 2011 at 2:44 pm
You didn’t really address Alon’s point. Numbers make for better talking points than questions, and the current numbers aren’t doing the project any favors.
Yes, I do want to see CAHSR be built, but not a cost that would bankrupt everybody.
Alon Levy Reply:
November 2nd, 2011 at 4:52 pm
You know, they don’t have to build transportation if it’s too expensive. They can spend the money on unemployment benefits, or on making UC free, or on boosting K-12 education spending so that the state won’t rank about 47th nationwide on education quality metrics.
joe Reply:
November 3rd, 2011 at 4:24 am
Or cure cancer!
We could solve the CA education problem by fixing or repealing Prop 13 which created the problem. Rail didn’t steal money from Education. Or the US can make trades with spending such as bank bail outs or industrial-war-machine spending.
So many ways to solve the problem besides making HSR the pot-o-gold for everyone’s pet issue.
Peter Reply:
November 3rd, 2011 at 5:30 am
I wonder what it would take to make higher education free?
RisenMessiah Reply:
November 3rd, 2011 at 12:59 pm
Not as much as you would think.
paul dyson Reply:
November 2nd, 2011 at 1:55 pm
@Tony, none of your hopes is likely to materialize. RailPAC has always called for an incremental approach. HSR compatible upgrades at LAUS and on the Peninsula, building of an “Electrolink” regional network Sacto, Stockton, San Jose, SF to HSR standards. Similar upgrades to Metrolink in the south. Each piece provides real benefits from the first day, not a stranded investment in the middle of the SJV. With robust regional systems carrying large numbers of passengers, capable of running l/d hsr trains into city centers, you then have a Euro model which justifies the HS links in the middle of the state. The current plan does all this backwards and if implemented will surely fail, and worse, drag down all passenger rail investment with it.
PD
Donk Reply:
November 2nd, 2011 at 2:14 pm
In other words, RailPAC is a bunch of steam train foamers that thinks small. No vision. How long has it taken to get Caltrain electrified? Yeah, that movement has gotten a lot of political support behind it. Sounds like a great plan.
paul dyson Reply:
November 2nd, 2011 at 2:44 pm
On the contrary, we have had a vision for CA and the west for years. We may not have been effective as an organization in accomplishing these goals, but then HSR hasn’t been built either! It’s a pity you don’t have the intellect to debate my proposition, rather than make childish attacks on our group using (presumably) a nom de plume.
PD
Donk Reply:
November 2nd, 2011 at 10:47 pm
What you are missing is that nobody is going to invest in your “vision”. You won’t get a state bond measure, major federal funding, or private investors to electrify these corridors, except maybe for Caltrain. Your only hope is for local sales tax measures to pay for all this. They only way your vision will play out is if HSR gets going and you can build off of that momentum.
Look at the $950M pot of money that came along with the $9.95B HSR bond. If HSR really gets going, there will be way more where that came from. Your best best is to get on the real HSR bandwagon and wait for the left over scraps.
joe Reply:
November 3rd, 2011 at 4:28 am
Backwards how?
National highway system wasn’t incremental construction out of NYC, it began in MO..
The benefit of a core HSR backbone in the CV is it’s the place we can operate at true High Speeds and gain experience operating a system. Validation of the system. It’s also an incentive to build out from urban areas rather than the opposite which we have HAD and never did get built up and extended.
Finally, why ISN’T the desperate plight of 15-20% unemployment part of the benefit of constructing a HSR system in the CV? When did people’s suffering stop mattering?
jim Reply:
November 3rd, 2011 at 8:22 am
The Interstates aren’t a good comparison. Yes, the initial section of interstate highway was in the middle of nowhere, but there were existing roads that it connected to at both ends; cars and trucks could seamlessly run between the stub of interstate and the existing roads. Similarly, when SNCF built the first section of the LGV Sud-Est, it built it halfway between Paris and Lyon but there were existing, electrified railroads that led to Paris and Lyon that SNCF owned and operated that it connected to and TGVs could seamlessly run between the legacy lines and the stub of LGV.
But that’s not the case in California. The ICS at best connects to tracks owned and operated by UP and BNSF. The IOS-South, even if it extends to Sylmar, connects to tracks owned by SCRRA but operated by UP. High speed trains can’t run seamlessly between the legacy tracks and the ICS or the IOS-South. The IOS-North connects to tracks owned and operated by Caltrain, but, as we’ve seen in the “blended operation” paper, high speed trains will run anything but seamlessly between the IOS-North and the Caltrain tracks.
The original idea that the system was going to get built all at once wasn’t a pipe dream. It was something forced on CHSRA. Its abandonment has meant tsuris.
Tony d. Reply:
November 2nd, 2011 at 2:44 pm
You know Paul, that’s what I’m talking about! A true alternative to the current scheme, not just a bunch of naysaying hot air. Perhaps this should get serious consideration IF the current scheme becomes unattainable.
Caelestor Reply:
November 2nd, 2011 at 2:51 pm
I’d have to argue that judging by the reactions to the report, the current scheme, at least in the Bay Area and Palmdale, has become unattainable. The CV part of the line seems to be well-done, so that alone means there’s still hope for the project.
Let’s hope this report doesn’t signify the end of this. A lot of us want to see this built, but we don’t want to bankrupt ourselves in the process.
joe Reply:
November 2nd, 2011 at 8:30 pm
Bankrupt ourselves is a bit of hyperbole.
What I like about the CV start is it gets something running, over time we’ll see if the Bay Area’s Peninsula can maintain their status quo. Given the continued infill and expansion in PAMPA (Facebook, Google and Stanford) and dropping interest in automobiles for millennia’s, I’m skeptical today’s reaction is definitive.
If the debate is about opportunity costs then the entire budget is open for review, not HSR vs local rail vs schools. I propose we rethink building and maintaining a global empire with contractor for profit workforce. I also believe we’ve documented 60B in waste on no bid contracts in Iraq.
Joey Reply:
November 2nd, 2011 at 9:03 pm
What I like about the CV start is it gets something running
Not really. There won’t be demand for anything more than a nearly trivial number of Amtrak runs until LA or SJ are reached.
joe Reply:
November 2nd, 2011 at 9:36 pm
They’ll be able to run trains at true high speeds which allows the operator to validate the system and gain operational experience.
There will be demand to connect rail to this backbone.
It’s a lot more useful than the multi-billion dollar Iraq embassy compound or freedom bombing across the globe with B2s based in the US.
Joey Reply:
November 3rd, 2011 at 9:29 am
They will not be running any high-speed trains until the IOS is complete. There simply won’t be enough demand for that.
Caelestor Reply:
November 2nd, 2011 at 2:34 pm
You know, there’s other priorities besides HSR. One that instantly comes to mind is fixing the UC system.
And please stop your swatch of ad hominem attacks (nobody here is making “lies,” there are some obvious alarms that have been triggered by this report). Don’t stoop to R. Mlynarik’s levels.
adirondacker12800 Reply:
November 2nd, 2011 at 3:03 pm
You can’t use Prop 1A money for anything other than HSR. Can’t use HSR money from the Federal Government for anything other than HSR.
Alon Levy Reply:
November 2nd, 2011 at 4:53 pm
Fair enough, but PB is openly calling for localities to kick in more money toward the project.
adirondacker12800 Reply:
November 2nd, 2011 at 6:48 pm
If localities want iconic stations, why shouldn’t they pay for them? ..I’ve been in Metropark….
If Palo Alto wants a tunnel, they should pay for it. Some sort of elevated gives Palo Alto something much better than what they have now. Caelestor apparently wants to spend the money on something unrelated to transportation.
Caelestor Reply:
November 2nd, 2011 at 8:18 pm
I’m just suggesting other options that could make better use of taxpayers’ money. The 30-10 plan is another potential transportation-related area where the money can go. I personally think it’s dangerous to dedicate money to something that just keeps sucking up money with no medium-term benefit in sight.
In other words, just find a way to reduce costs, and everyone’ll be much happier.
joe Reply:
November 2nd, 2011 at 9:42 pm
Yes, better uses for our taxes dollars like … further extend the Bush tax cuts on millionaires, subsidize oil companies, give money to bank-casinos at 0.25% interest and fund a war-machine to wage endless wars overseas.
Why would a responsible transportation advocate aways starts with public infrastructure and ask if education, hungry babies and orphans wouldn’t be better served than building some imperfect public works project.
CA’s education problems can be traced directly to Prop 13, not HSR.
adirondacker12800 Reply:
November 2nd, 2011 at 10:36 pm
You can’t reallocate the dedicated HSR funding. It gets spent on HSR or it doesn’t get spent.
Caelestor Reply:
November 2nd, 2011 at 10:39 pm
alright, guys, this is getting tiring,we obviously disagree on these things. just do whatever you want, I should be focusing on my work. sorry for derailing the conversation.
StevieB Reply:
November 2nd, 2011 at 11:44 pm
If you want more money for schools work on repealing prop. 13 for commercial properties. Those properties have created a windfall for businesses from money used by most states to pay for schools and a competitive barrier to new businesses.
joe Reply:
November 2nd, 2011 at 8:32 pm
Okay, let’s fix the UC system. Repeal Prop 13 or at least ammende it for commercial real-estate.
I refuse play and live in Howard Jarvis’ sandbox.
I think the Authority quickly needs to fund some value engineering for the ENTIRE SF-LA route. They need to bring the scope (and thereby cost) down by a LOT in order for it to be palatable for continued political. They need to highlight that $98.5 billion is NOT the final number, and that it can be significantly less.
Peter Reply:
November 2nd, 2011 at 3:34 pm
Bleh. “continued political support.”
Donk Reply:
November 2nd, 2011 at 10:29 pm
Exactly!
The new business plan isn’t a game changer. It’s Game Over.
CAHSR effectively pled no contest to rank incompetence with this $98 billion nuclear bomb. By setting this price, it kills this and future high-speed rail plans in California and anywhere else in America. All future HSR plans will be set according to this price.
Robert, seriously, pack it in. There’s no point in even discussing high-speed rail anymore. And if you believe with any sincerity in a positive spin on this report, you need to be 5150′d.
Everyone else here, we all need to give up and get on with our lives. Well not Morris or Synonymouse, for obvious reasons. There’s no point in wasting any more time, energy or bandwidth in something that we’ll never have the money, brains or self-discipline to carry through.
adirondacker12800 Reply:
November 2nd, 2011 at 3:46 pm
If California doesn’t want the money the Midwest and the Northeast can find plenty of things to do with it.
Tony D. Reply:
November 2nd, 2011 at 4:12 pm
Playing devils advocate: If we hit the “reset” button on HSR and forfeited the federal funds, what to do? Again, I would consider “splitting” Prop. 1A funds between NorCal and SoCal ($4.5 billion each). Leverage that with private/foreign investment and future federal loans (maybe up to $7 billion each). Perhaps this would then get us HSR Caltrain, ACE and Metrolink in the short term, with a final connection in the CV later when the two “regional HSR’s” prove profitable. Just thinking outside the box with this one, no harm no foul.
Donk Reply:
November 2nd, 2011 at 10:31 pm
If they put some of the funds towards SoCal, it will go straight to the LA-Anaheim route. This is the wrong direction. Sorry, not interested.
StevieB Reply:
November 2nd, 2011 at 11:49 pm
Perhaps you could start an initiative to do just that. It only takes a small filing fee to start and dozens of initiatives are started each year. The California constitution is a living document.
Alex M. Reply:
November 2nd, 2011 at 10:55 pm
Why don’t more people realize that HSR will eventually HAVE to be built since oil is not going to last forever? If it is game over for now, that just means HSR will be built when it’s an absolute necessity. And it’ll be even more expensive then.
RisenMessiah Reply:
November 3rd, 2011 at 9:53 am
You would be right if this were 1982. Basically, this is the Authority conforming to the realism of Brown’s leadership as a contrast to the loose-goose Arnold days. This is political triangulation, nothing more.
The most important thing in the report is that they have identified a path to early profitability – with the IOS estimated to be making on operating profit of between 300 and 500 million dollars annually. That means that after the IOS gets built (cost: $30 billion) we could – in principle – spend no more taxpayer money at all and the entire system would, eventually, get built albeit VERY SLOWLY.
That number – cost to taxpayer to get to profitability – is the number that matters for any debate about “how we should spend our money” or “government boondoggles”
Richard Mlynarik Reply:
November 2nd, 2011 at 4:07 pm
Other than that Mrs Lincoln, how was the play?
Richard Mlynarik Reply:
November 2nd, 2011 at 4:08 pm
“Other than that Mrs Lincoln, how was the play?”
egk Reply:
November 2nd, 2011 at 6:53 pm
Sure, it would be nice to do an IOS-South for a third less or so. But we might hope that – once the HSR system gets to the other side of profitability, there is significant motivation for rational decision making (not based on the political rent-seeking behavior you often lampoon).
Alon Levy Reply:
November 2nd, 2011 at 7:11 pm
That’s only true if there’s no source of funding except profits. DB is profitable; it also engages in rent-seeking, converting slow intercity lines into regional lines so that it can collect state subsidies.
egk Reply:
November 4th, 2011 at 1:05 am
oh come on – we are talking a different order of magnitude there. And, as you know, the regional lines are tendered out and so DB can (and has) lose the entire market to another provider. And, of course, the subsidizers have a very good idea of what they should be paying for their transit dollars.
StevieB Reply:
November 2nd, 2011 at 11:53 pm
I believe any profit from operations would go into the state general fund but a tally could be made to compare to costs. It would just not be said to be paying for construction costs.
Quite simply, SF-SJ and LA-Anahaim will never be built to CAHSR’s current plan. Here’s how I think (hope) it will work:
1) CAHSR value engineers the hell out of Bakersfield-LA in order to get it built using the remaining Prop 1A money plus some federal dollars
2) Private operator begins revenue service, and is asked by CAHSR to fund extension to SF
3) Private operator hires their own consultant who value engineers the he’ll out of the PB/CAHSR plan, and possibly switches to Altamont. Sorry San Jose, you just ain’t in the budget…
4) Extension to SF is constructed using private money plus possibly state, federal and local money (MTC may chip in as the upgrades will benefit ACE and/or Caltrain)
Jon Reply:
November 2nd, 2011 at 8:58 pm
Ha, stupid autocorrect
joe Reply:
November 2nd, 2011 at 9:54 pm
“Never” is a long time.
If traffic today is an indicator, Bay Area Peninsula Cities are going hit a brick wall with the status quo. Google, Facebook and Stanford all plan massive expansion along congested HW 101. They are going to want the Rail ROW improvements only affordable with joint HSR funding.
I’d play East Bay and San Jose against each other for value engineering the route. It’s ridiculous to not expect similar objections and design creep with an Altamont alignment.
Extension to SF is very expensive and will need public money – the key is to NOT build if Money is No Object design is demanded. The congestion and high cost of living makes recruiting and keeping people working in that corridore very costly. They’ll find ways to make it affordable if the system is running and LA is already connected.
Tony d. Reply:
November 3rd, 2011 at 9:49 am
San Jose will the ALWAYS be in the budget. But go ahead, continue with your pathetic criticism of economically, politically powerful $an Jo$e, $ilicon Valley.
synonymouse Reply:
November 3rd, 2011 at 10:17 am
@ Tony D.
MTC & friends have already replaced hsr with BART Ring the Bay. Caltrain lost.