Mark Reutter, a rail policy expert and editor of Railroad History, has a memo up at Progressive Policy Institute arguing that Obama’s HSR strategy is wrong – that instead of spreading funds to a number of different projects, the federal government should instead focus on two state projects – in this case, California and Florida.

The Florida and California proposals that we believed should have served as templates for an emerging HSR program got far fewer funds than they deserved. Both proposals call for lightweight, electrically propelled trains on dedicated guideways running at 150 to 220 mph. Each state got enough stimulus money ($1.25 billion for Florida and $2.25 billion for California) to begin construction, but without any assurance that a working segment can be finished and placed in revenue service. This is a big problem that needs to be remedied.

As we’ve explained before, this was likely a political decision to give CA and FL just enough to get underway, but leave enough of the $8 billion in stimulus to spread to other states so as to build support in Congress for further funding. It’s certainly a gamble, one that would have better odds were the White House to push more aggressively a long-term federal funding plan for HSR.

Reutter’s argument is somewhat different – that part of the problem was that the authority to make the stimulus awards was given to the Federal Railroad Administration:

Responsibility for the program was handed to the Federal Railroad Administration, a small branch of the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) that deals primarily with railway safety. There was no precedent for what it had been tasked to do by President Obama. Awarding high-speed passenger projects was a new responsibility for which the agency was largely unprepared and unequipped.

Because it lacked personnel with backgrounds in HSR, the FRA fell back on what it knew best – conventional railway operations – to evaluate grant applications from the states. And the state applications were mostly dusted-off commuter-rail or incremental Amtrak projects, because most state DOTs have no more experience in executing HSR projects than the federal government.

There does seem to be a very real problem with the FRA’s inability to properly plan for HSR. Their current rules and regulations preclude using off-the-shelf HSR technology on existing tracks, although Caltrain is pursuing an FRA waiver to get around those rules. If the federal government is going to dole out HSR funds, there need to be some sort of guidelines that reflect the specific needs of HSR, that aren’t yoked to the FRA’s backward-looking notions of rail safety.

Reutter goes on to propose a set of policy fixes that I’ll quote in their entirety:

To rectify this situation, we make the following policy recommendations to the administration and Congress:

* use the $2.5 billion that Congress has authorized for HSR in 2010 to fully fund the Tampa-Orlando project and provide enough aid to the California project so that a segment of the system can be operational by 2015.

* provide HSR funds only to projects that feature a dedicated, electric-powered system operating at 150 mph or higher. Adopt international standards for HSR design and construction to guarantee the highest-quality engineering.

* define upgraded rail corridors as “CSR,” or conventional-speed rail, which could be funded by a separate aid program.

* develop a sustained source for both HSR and CSR funding, such as a national infrastructure bank advocated by PPI, to ensure a regular and predicable source of funds outside of annual congressional appropriations.

* set up a Federal HSR Administration, distinct from the FRA and comparable in staff and technical expertise to the Federal Highway Administration. An agency with a specified infrastructure-building mandate is necessary to move the program forward.

So far, so good. From my perspective the top priority is the “sustained source” for HSR funding. I’m quite supportive of what Reutter calls “CSR”, and agree that it too needs a clear but separate pot of funds to draw upon. Mixing other intercity passenger rail with true HSR isn’t going to produce the kind of consistency we need.

* locate high-speed rail lines, wherever feasible, along highway corridors instead of privately owned freight railroads. The Florida HSR line will use an alignment alongside I-4 between Tampa and Orlando. In other areas, interstates pass through land that is often owned by the federal government, so land-acquisition costs are minimal.

As you can guess, I don’t agree with Reutter here. Highway corridors are generally bad places to build HSR, since it makes it less likely that the stations will be placed in city centers. The Transport Politic argues highway corridors are bad for light rail and I think those insights generally hold true for HSR. There is value in using some highway corridors when you’re between cities and stations, but not within them.

Further, if access to ROW is the problem, the federal government can simply use its regulatory power over the railroads to force Union Pacific to play nicely with HSR projects. Freight railroads are creations of the federal government and most of their land was given to them outright as an incentive to build. There is every reason for the feds to remind the railroads of their public obligations and to back it up with legislation.

* encourage the private sector to invest in HSR-building by offering real-estate opportunities along the rights-of-way, such as reserving land near HSR terminals for companies that help underwrite rail projects.

* open HSR train and station services to bids from private contractors to enhance the revenue stream from ticket sales.

California is already proposing both. As I’ve said consistently, we should be open to private investment but be cautious about how it is implemented. Full public funding is preferable.

* encourage domestic manufacture of HSR cars and locomotives through well-targeted tax credits and “green” credits

Also a very good idea.

Ultimately I share Reutter’s view that in terms of practicality, HSR funding ought to be concentrated on true 150 mph and higher bullet train systems. Politically, though, I’m willing to live with spreading the first funds out a bit more broadly – if that is matched by a commitment from the White House and Congressional leadership of both parties to permanently support and sustain HSR funding.