HSR Lessons From China

Feb 8th, 2010 | Posted by Robert Cruickshank

Although most HSR critics and deniers seems to believe that the US is still living in the 1960s where we’re the richest, most innovative country in the world and therefore doesn’t need to feel competitive with anyone else, here in 2010 the reality is that the US could learn from the experiences of other countries, and adopt innovations they have pursued themselves.

One of the best such examples is China’s massive investment in high speed rail, which was the subject of an interesting USA Today article:

The Dec. 26 opening of the high-speed link between south Chinese cities Guangzhou and Wuhan is the latest example of massive state spending to keep China’s economy roaring. The fast-expanding network of high-speed trains is stoking patriotism, too.

“This train is the pride of the Chinese people,” says Hu, 42, the boss of a paper factory, who chose the train over a direct flight home to northeast China.

Why is HSR popular in China? Let’s hear what its riders have to say:

Speed and convenience are paramount for business traveler Zhao Shiquan. The founder of an environmental equipment company, Zhao stopped checking in for a Wuhan flight at Guangzhou airport in late December when a friend suggested the new train.

“I wanted to know which is more convenient, the plane or the train?” says Zhao, settling into his reclinable, first-class seat.

At $110 one way, the train is more expensive than flying because airlines such as China Southern Airlines offer prices as low as $28 to fight the new competitor.

But many people still prefer the trains.

“Planes are often late, and time is vital to a company,” says Zhao, 42, who employs 100 people in his firm in Changsha, a major city en route. “In China, you need to meet people in person to do business, and take clients out for meals, so I often have to travel. High-speed trains could be the answer.”

As was discussed in the comments to yesterday’s post, this is also an issue here in California, where flights to and from SFO are subject to frequent fog-related delays that HSR won’t have to worry about. Not only are planes often late, flying in the US has also become very inconvenient over the last decade, to the point where many travelers would likely welcome an alternative that is comparable, if not superior, in cost and travel time.

There are other reasons why Chinese HSR has done well:

The trains are powered by electricity, so they’re not weighed down by huge engines and hundreds of gallons of diesel fuel. The carriages of the “Harmony” trains running between these two cities bear a smart, plane-like appearance, with restrooms far larger than their airborne counterparts.

Attendants dressed like air stewards push trolleys of snacks, including beer and peanuts, down aisles that are patrolled by two armed, uniformed policemen.

The dining car, usually a noisy focus of days-long Chinese rail journeys, appears a zone of quiet. Only microwaved Chinese dishes and fast food such as beefburgers, at $1.30 each, are available.

So it seems like a comfortable, modern way to travel, which counts for a lot in a country whose extensive rail network often left a lot to be desired to the traveler. Of course, the debate about whether HSR is worth the cost is one that is happening in China, just as it is over here:

The focus on infrastructure, and failure to raise incomes, has created a “lopsided development model,” that may leave China as “an emerging market economy without emerging consumers,” worried You Nuo in the state-run China Daily.

The cost of building high-speed tracks, at $20.1 million per mile, is money well spent, counters Qian Lixin, a veteran rail expert at the China Academy of Railway Sciences in Beijing.

“China has met many difficulties in construction, and gained experience in building railroads at low cost. But American railways are owned by individuals, not the government, so investment is the biggest problem,” Qian says.

You’s argument is not that different from Larry Summers, who doesn’t believe sustainable infrastructure helps create jobs or consumers. Both You and Summers are simply wrong. The HSR projects helped to tide over China’s large class of construction workers, ensuring they were able to keep consuming during a global slowdown. That meant lasting investment and greater prosperity for workers across the country. Further, the existence of fast, electrified trains will help reduce China’s dependence on imported oil, meaning that as peak oil begins to bite even harder in the coming years, Chinese workers won’t see more of their paychecks going to buy oil. Of course, it would help if China were to develop more sustainable and renewable sources of electricity to power the trains.

Unfortunately, USA Today also gave space to let anti-train zealot Randall O’Toole rant against HSR, without telling readers his work has been funded by oil companies:

“Transportation works best if you use markets, not subsidies by government,” says Randal O’Toole, a senior fellow at the libertarian Cato Institute who researches transportation and urban planning.

“High-speed rail is an obsolete technology that requires huge subsidies in France, Japan and China. Our government seems to view trains as a form of social engineering that they think is better than driving or flying,” he says. “Everybody will pay for these new rail lines through taxes, but only a few people will use them.”

O’Toole says high-speed rail here will just transfer wealth from airline owners to train owners, at great expense to taxpayers as contracts go to the politically connected. He also rejects the argument that trains are more convenient because they deliver people into the heart of cities instead of to airports outside of cities.

“Less than 8% of all jobs in the U.S. are located in the downtown of our cities,” he says.

What a bunch of bullshit.

American transportation is largely government-run (look at our roads) and it works just fine. Our roads are subsidized and nobody seems to complain much, even here in Orange County where new freeway lanes were paid for by sales taxes. HSR in France and Japan requires public funding to build but not to operate, but O’Toole lies to the USA Today reporter about this and makes it sound like the train operations need subsidy, which they don’t.

This notion of “transferring wealth” is just ridiculous. It’s as if O’Toole were advocating in 1910 that government should subsidize the candlemaking and horse-and-buggy industries and not fund any new roads so as to protect those existing owners. It’s just nonsense, and it’s a sign of how little regard our media gives to facts that they let this get printed.

In any case, as with most HSR systems, once people ride the trains, they see the value and become regular customers:

At the end of the line, businessman Zhao considers his trial run a success, and vows to return.

“I feel very proud, as China now has the fastest train in the world. On average incomes, we remain far behind the West, and it’s very hard to catch up,” he says. “But in some areas we are very advanced.”

Stories like Zhao’s will become commonplace here in California at the end of this decade, as long as we don’t let ourselves get distracted by the critics and ensure that we get HSR built as planned.

The Plane Or The Train? Comparing Travel Options In An HSR Era

Feb 7th, 2010 | Posted by Robert Cruickshank

I’m down in Orange County for the weekend, visiting the old stomping grounds. I hope to make time for a short trip to look at the Anaheim ROW before the Super Bowl gets underway.

Trips like these always remind me of how much easier HSR would be. To get here, my wife took me to San Jose Airport yesterday, where I took a flight to LAX. Flights from Monterey to LAX were insanely expensive by the time I booked my flight just over a week ago, and I couldn’t find any affordable flights that met my schedule needs from San Jose to John Wayne Airport. So I flew into LAX and then hopped on board the FlyAway Bus to Irvine, where my family picked me up and drove me back to Tustin. Door to door, it was 6 hours:

Left Monterey at 7 AM, arrived at SJC at 8:15
Plane boarded at 9:15, took off at 9:45
Landed at LAX at 11
Boarded FlyAway bus at 11:45
Arrived at Irvine around 12:40
Arrived in Tustin around 1 PM

Sure, there was some waiting around at LAX for the FlyAway bus, and perhaps I could have left Monterey around 7:30. But even if I had left Monterey then, and had caught the FlyAway bus as soon as I made it out of the terminal (which took a good 15 minutes since I flew into the commuter terminal) I’d have saved 45 minutes or so. So 5-6 hours is the ballpark.

Now how long would that take on HSR? According to the CHSRA, Gilroy to Anaheim will be 2 hours, 16 minutes. Of course, depending on the mix of local stops, it might take longer. Still, it’s 45 minutes from Monterey to Gilroy, so let’s say I leave Monterey 60 minutes before departure (since I’d want to leave some time to spare). Then spend maybe 2:30 on the train, and 20 minutes or so from ARTIC to Tustin, depending on which family member picks me up. That’s about 4 hours’ travel time. Much better than 6, even if fares were set at 83% of comparable airfares. And even if I needed to pad my trip a bit more between Monterey and Gilroy, it’s still a savings over air travel, if not quite as dramatic, and likely for a cheaper price, especially once you factor in the increases in oil prices over the next 10 years.

Every time I travel back to Southern California, I always think “this would be so much easier on high speed rail.”

HSR Critics Craft A Magic Bullet Theory

Feb 7th, 2010 | Posted by Robert Cruickshank

The opposition to California high speed rail has generally emphasized different things at different times. In 2008 the arguments focused around claims that HSR wasn’t necessary for California, wouldn’t work here, that nobody would ride it, etc. Those arguments were roundly rejected by California voters when they voted to approve $10 billion in funding for the project in November 2008.

In 2009 the opposition shifted. Recognizing that trying to argue against the concept of HSR in California was a non-starter, opponents instead tried to undermine the project by arguing that the route choices were flawed, or that communities would be destroyed by the project. After a burst of NIMBY energy in early 2009, this began to fade as it became clear that state and federal lawmakers were not going to let a group of prosperous Peninsula residents block a project that had widespread public support and was a necessary part of the state’s economic recovery. Indeed, by early 2010 NIMBYism had faded significantly as a threat to the overall project, though it continued to play a big role in debates over routing and implementation.

By 2010 the folks who didn’t want HSR to happen had focused on trying to destroy the project and the CHSRA’s credibility by combing through every document available to find ANY flaw they could – a search for a magic bullet, like decades of JFK assassination conspiracy theorists. It didn’t matter whether the flaw actually meant the whole HSR project was fatally flawed. All that mattered was that some discrepancy be found. Because if that were possible, then they could use that discrepancy to argue that the project is flawed without ever having to show precisely how the flaw means the project isn’t viable.

Let’s be very clear about that. The goal wasn’t to explain why HSR won’t generate operating surpluses, or suggest that California doesn’t need the trains. The goal of HSR critics was to instead find a flaw and assume that finding a flaw automatically meant HSR has to stop, that everything the Authority says is false, that all numbers don’t pan out, etc, etc.

It is a fundamentally dishonest approach to public oversight of a project. But that is precisely what has happened here.

First it was the business plan. We were told that the plan was “illegal” because it suggested a public guarantee for investors. It wasn’t clear whether that actually was illegal, and in any case it didn’t get much media traction. We were then told that the fact that the overall cost estimate changed was proof that it was a boondoggle and CHSRA can’t be trusted. Of course, the shift was due to federal rules regarding year-of-expenditure costing. We were then told that a model that proposed setting fares at 83% of airfare instead of 50% was somehow a sellout and a bait-and-switch and meant the project was dishonest and we should revote.

But none of those criticisms stuck. Sure, some parts of the business plan still need work, but that’s natural in an evolving project like this. And the HSR critics seem to have instinctively understood this line of attack was going nowhere, because they quickly shifted toward a focus on ridership.

This was partly due to signals sent by HSR opponent Senator Alan Lowenthal, who has repeatedly tried to destroy the project. He even lied to the public when, on KQED a week ago, he claimed that everyone who spoke at the Palo Alto hearing raised “concerns” about the project – Lowenthal did not once mention the outpouring of public support for the project he had heard.

HSR critics picked up on Lowenthal’s extremely dishonest and irresponsible claim that “the ridership numbers don’t pass the smell test” as a green light to zero in on the ridership estimates to try and find their single flaw that would somehow bring down the project they disliked, since every other line of attack over the last two years had failed them. Lowenthal’s original “smell test” claim was totally baseless, since he had NO explanation for why they didn’t seem right. No evidence, no logical argument. All he said was it didn’t feel right to him. That’s not a serious statement, certainly not one that should be made by a state legislator with oversight powers over an important project.

The initial efforts of HSR critics to attack the ridership numbers here in 2010 was the laughable attempt by the PCC to suggest that HSR and Amtrak were legitimate comparisons – that any idea that HSR would draw more riders at its stations than Amtrak at its NEC stations was somehow ridiculous. In fact, that is precisely what will happen and is a totally justifiable claim.

So they quickly abandoned that, but did not abandon the search for their magic bullet. This week, they claimed they found it. Here’s what we know:

1. Cambridge Systematics wrote in a letter dated January 29, 2010 that the MTC chose not to include the final coefficients in the final project report. This was stated neutrally, as the letter clearly indicates. Cambridge Systematics did not claim MTC or CHSRA was being dishonest, fraudulent, or anything else. All they said was, in effect, “we weren’t the ones who chose not to include that information. Go ask MTC.” Yet HSR critics claim this was “deliberately withheld,” for reasons unstated yet apparently sinister. How do we know the reasons were sinister? Well, actually, we don’t. We’re supposed to just believe people who have a vested interest in making HSR look bad.

2. The coefficients in question were modified, as is claimed to be regular and legitimate practice. It is important to keep in mind that it remains unknown why the coefficients were changed. One report indicates it was done to assess the impact of travel time on ridership, but that does not exactly explain why the coefficients changed by the amounts they did. In the absence of that info, it would be wrong to assume that means CHSRA did something bad. Yet that is precisely the assumption being made by HSR critics. We’re supposed to jump to conclusions because critics ask us to do so.

3. Nobody has explained what the impact of the coefficient change actually was. Did it totally change the ridership numbers for Altamont and Pacheco, which were still very close even after the change? Was it alone responsible for the choice of Pacheco? Realize that Peninsula HSR critics have a vested interest in undermining the Pacheco alignment, because it might theoretically revive the Altamont alignment, which would direct the trains away from the communities that have been most vocally opposed to HSR (Menlo Park, Atherton, and Palo Alto). [UPDATE: Brian Stanke shows in the comments the shift took Altamont from 69 million to 65 million riders, and Pacheco from 65 million to 70 million riders.]

4. More importantly, nobody – not one single person – has explained how this invalidates ANYTHING regarding the overall ridership numbers, the revenue estimates, or the fiscal plans. We are supposed to just believe that because one controversial change was discovered, that suddenly the whole HSR project is in dire peril.

Nonsense.

What we have here is a question about how one element of one part of one ridership estimate was made. The question can be answered fairly straightfowardly, without a rush to judgement, and I hope that is precisely what we will get. I have communicated to the Authority my belief that complete openness is in their best interest, and I have every reason to believe they feel exactly the same way. After all, the ridership info in question WAS made public when HSR critics asked for it, wasn’t it?!

So why is this “magic bullet theory” getting so much attention? Let me explain some reasons why.

Americans are trained to think nobody rides trains and they all lose money, so anything that reinforces that frame helps kill HSR projects. As we know, this assumption is complete nonsense. Many passenger rail systems of various kinds in the country have significant ridership and meet their goals. HSR in particular consistently posts high ridership numbers across the globe. Further, all HSR systems, including Amtrak’s Acela, generate profits “above the rail” – meaning operating costs are covered, no ongoing subsidy is required. That is not true of California freeways, for example, which require a costly state subsidy to maintain operations, since gas taxes are insufficient to pay for necessary upkeep, certainly not for adding capacity (eve Orange County has used sales taxes to subsidize capital construction on new freeway lanes). But because HSR is a train, well, it’s easy to assume that it’s going to fail anyway, so anything that reinforces that preexisting assumption of failure is useful.

The media in particular are trained to believe that any discrepancy on the part of government is a sign of scandal. Plenty of reporters and media outlets make a living exposing government problems in breathless tones. Sometimes these are significant. But they usually don’t suggest the public service in question should be abolished or ended. When the University of California has a scandal over executive pay, nobody proposes the solution is to close down UC. When the East Span of the Bay Bridge cost estimates came in way above estimates, we didn’t decide to not replace the span. When hospitals commit billing errors, we don’t shut down the hospital. Instead in those cases we solve the underlying problems, ensure anyone who screwed up or intentionally erred is held accountable, and we move on to ensure we don’t lose sight of the big picture. Yet we’re supposed to now throw out all HSR plans and the project itself because a controversial coefficient change was found? Really?

Stephen Colbert was right – “truthiness” has replaced the truth. This entire controversy over ridership is a classic example of truthiness – “a “truth” that a person claims to know intuitively “from the gut” without regard to evidence, logic, intellectual examination, or facts.” When Alan Lowenthal said the ridership numbers “don’t pass the smell test,” he was engaging in truthiness. When HSR critics say the coefficient change means the entire ridership estimate is flawed and HSR is doomed, they too are engaging in truthiness. They found a magic bullet that they believe validates their preexisting worldview and now we’re all supposed to fall in line behind them and agree HSR sucks and we should just quit. No, I don’t think so.

A severe recession has created a public mood less accepting of any change or new idea at all, mobilizing public fear of spending new money on something that might not work. Across the political world, we see regressive forces beginning to prevail in their quest to stop us from solving deeper problems merely by suggesting the solutions might cost money or that the solutions might be imperfect. In a week where we learn one of California’s largest insurance companies will raise rates by over 30% on individual policy holders this year, we’re supposed to believe that health care reform is a bad idea that should be abandoned. After a decade of accepting that global warming is real and we should do something about it, we’re now supposed to believe that a few stupid emails sent by some British scientists somehow invalidate the entire effort to address the climate crisis, that we should instead do nothing while our planet heats up, our sea levels rise, and our state becomes drier (don’t let recent El Niño rains fool you).

There is a widespread effort in this country to use fear, uncertainty, and doubt – and especially concern about spending money – to keep the 20th century alive at all costs and to destroy any effort to do anything new. What we are seeing with this silly “magic bullet theory” being peddled by HSR critics is not at all different from the people trying to repeal AB 32 or trying to stop federal health care reform from happening. It all involves critics and defenders of the status quo taking false or misleading claims about one piece of the overall reform or need to act and using them to insinuate the whole reform or underlying issue is nonsense and should be ignored – even though their claims have not actually shown what they claim has been shown.

It’s like assuming a kid who flunked a math test is mentally challenged and doesn’t deserve to continue their education. It’s like assuming that because Apollo 1 burned up on the launch pad that we shouldn’t go to the moon.

In short, it’s absurd to use one controversy to attack an entire project. But that is what the HSR critics want to do, because all they feel they have to do is sow doubt, whether or not it’s backed by reasonable analysis, and they’ll win.

I hope for the sake of this state and its future that we will reject that, and demand solid analysis backed by strong evidence from all sides in the HSR discussion. If someone at MTC or the CHSRA did something they shouldn’t have, I will lead the call for them to be held accountable and face the proper consequences. But I’m not going to fall into the trap of assuming that just because a magic bullet theory is claimed, that I’ll abandon the HSR project. I hope others will refuse to fall into that trap as well.

Who Will Get the HSR Stimulus Funds?

Feb 6th, 2010 | Posted by Robert Cruickshank

Although we had expected the question of who gets the HSR stimulus to be settled by the FRA when the awards were made last month, we now know that was just the start of an ongoing process to get those funds translated into steel in the ground. California has either $1.825 billion or $2.25 billion in federal HSR stimulus funds (depending on whether or not the $400 million for the Transbay Terminal is counted as part of the $2.25 billion grant), but it’s apparently up to the CHSRA and the governor to determine how those will be split up among the eligible corridors – San Francisco to San José, Merced to Fresno, Fresno to Bakersfield, and Los Angeles to Anaheim.

Speaking after Thursday’s CHSRA board meeting, Rod Diridon suggested that the question over which segment gets the funds means the Bay Area segment has to “catch up” to the rest of the state, as reported by Mike Rosenberg:

California High-Speed Rail Authority board member Rod Diridon said after a San Diego board meeting that of the four corridors eligible for the federal cash, the Los Angeles-to-Anaheim section was clearly leading. He said the corridor is about 18 months ahead of the San Francisco-to-San Jose section in terms of planning.

“We’re going to have to catch up (in the Bay Area),” said Diridon, one of two Bay Area representative on the board, which is in charge of divvying up stimulus funds. “That doesn’t mean shortcut — shortcuts are deadly.”…

At the very least, he said they would “put a lot of pressure” on the Bay Area engineering team to maintain its schedule. In the Bay Area last year, the state extended a public outreach process by 30 days and its critical report on track alignment, originally scheduled for completion in December, now will be out in March.

The larger staff would not necessarily accelerate the process past checkpoints, only ensure planners don’t fall behind schedule while holding all the public hearings they promised, Diridon said.

Diridon’s caution against “shortcuts” is important here, and the timeline proposed is fair, though work will have to be done to ensure that Context Sensitive Solutions doesn’t get tossed aside in the process. The need for economic stimulus and jobs in the Bay Area is still desperate, and there is every reason to believe we can balance that with the need to run a fair and thorough public input process.

Of course, the mere mention of “catching up” is causing concern on the Peninsula that it might indeed mean cutting corners on public engagement:

But many officials and residents in the Peninsula and South Bay have pushed for the opposite, hoping to slow down the process to make sure each detail is tirelessly examined. They already fear the White House stimulus grant awarded last week will spark the authority into a mad dash that could result in oversights and critical errors. The state needs to enter a construction contract by September 2012 or lose the federal money.

Some of these voices were heard at the Palo Alto State Senate hearing last month, calling for a delay of the stimulus so that more time could be taken to assess the project and possible ways to build it, including Palo Alto mayor Pat Burt.

Such a delay is unnecessary. The engineering team working on the Peninsula is going to publish its Alternatives Analysis next month, and preliminary outreach to stakeholders about that analysis are already under way. That analysis will help clarify many questions and uncertainties about the project, and provide for a more focused discussion. That discussion may not be any less contentious, but it will be more productive in that there will be something more concrete (literally and figuratively) to look at, to examine, and to help provide feedback to the Caltrain/HSR project.

One of the most common and notorious ways to kill a project or an idea one dislikes is to study it to death. That can’t happen with high speed rail. At the same time, the people of California, no matter where they happen to live, deserve the ability to provide input and have their voices heard about the project proposal. Additionally, there is the commitment to a CSS process that must be respected.

There is every reason to believe those commitments, those obligations to receive public input, and the need to produce solid plans can be done in time to meet federal stimulus deadlines on the Peninsula – if the present timeline and schedule is kept.

A spirit of honest collaboration may be slowly starting to emerge on the Peninsula. High speed rail is going to happen. Let’s hope all the parties on the Peninsula, including the great silent majority of HSR supporters, are able to work together to ensure this gets built in a way that fits the community’s needs.